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I. INTRODUCTION
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless
lives."'
One commentator has correctly pointed out that "Title VII [of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)]2 has produced more legislative
overrulings of Supreme Court decisions than any other statute
enacted." 3 One might view the length of that list of overrulings as
inversely proportional to the level of the Court's enthusiasm for civil
rights in America. Although the Court has been most active in softening
Title VII's impact on employment discrimination, it has not exactly
embraced other civil rights legislation. Indeed, that the Court has
declared war on civil rights is a proposition too clear to be seriously
contested. 4 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing C0.5 is the latest
example of the Court's position regarding civil rights.6 In McKennon,
the Court, for the first time, grappled with the impact of the after-
acquired evidence defense in federal disparate-treatment litigation. 7
Although the after-acquired evidence defense is not new to labor law, 8
1. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934) (Brandeis, J.).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,78 Stat. 255,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-14 (1994).
3. Jonathan Levy, In Response to Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC
Marketing Corp.: Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand On, 80 MINN. L. REV. 123, 140 n.85
(1995) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(expanding Title VII to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions by overruling Supreme Court precedent holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex
discrimination); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982)
(clarifying dates and definitions concerning voting rights by modifying Supreme Court precedent);
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(3), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (overturning or modifying
six Supreme Court decisions and providing additional employment discrimination remedies by
modifying Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989) and overruling EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991); West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S.
83 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Tech.,
Inc., 490 U.S. 900,912-15 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)).
4. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. See also Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and
the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C.
L. REV. 203, 204 (1993) (stating: "Civil rights are under siege. In mid-1989, the United States
Supreme Court decided several cases that severely limit the civil rights claims and remedies available
to a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination. Experts have widely criticized those decisions, with
one expert terming them a 'tragedy' for minorities and women.") (footnotes omitted).
5. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
6. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
7. Id. at 884-85.
8. See In re Wagner Elec. Corp., 61 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 363. 367 (1973) (relying on after-
acquired evidence to determine that the grievant was not entitled to any remedy despite the
impropriety of the original reason for discharge).
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management has fashioned it into a weapon for virtually all liability
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).9
Employers use this defensive tactic after their employees sue them
for unlawful discrimination under the ADEA. During discovery,
employers learn that the employees previously engaged in misconduct
that would have warranted discharge. Relying on that misconduct,
employers then attempt to prove that, in any event, they would have fired
the employees upon learning of the misconduct. In determining the
impact of the after-acquired evidence defense, a unanimous Court
steered a meandering course between the two wrongdoers largely
stripping employees of their remedial rights for having engaged in shop-
floor misconduct. 10
This Article makes two fundamental arguments. First, although the
United States Supreme Court relied on the antidiscriminatory policy to
fashion the remedial standards in McKennon, the Court's approach fell
short of the mark. Second, unless the federal antidiscrimination policy
rigorously mediates the resolution of remedial issues in after-acquired
evidence disputes, that policy will suffer yet another serious blow. In
making those arguments, the Article primarily focuses on four major
issues: (1) the propriety of considering after-acquired evidence in
federal antidiscrimination litigation and the conceptual difficulties that
arise from that practice; (2) the presence of mixed-motive issues in after-
acquired evidence litigation; (3) the implication of the Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) exception for after-acquired
evidence disputes; and (4) the potential evidentiary issues in after-
acquired evidence disputes including the relative merits of the "did
discover" and "would have discovered" standards.
The Article contains four sections, including this introduction which
is Section I. Section II presents the facts in McKennon, drawing on the
opinions of the federal district court and the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. Then Section II examines the Court's decision and
rationale in McKennon.
Section III analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the Court's
opinion and offers an alternative approach. First, Section III discusses
why simply recognizing after-acquired evidence injects potentially
complex issues of wrongful discharge into the remedial phase of ADEA
9. Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) [hereinafter
ADEA].
10. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. 879. Although McKennon arose under the ADEA, the principles
developed in McKennon (and the discussion in this article) fully apply to other antidiscrimination
statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-14 (1994).
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litigation, thereby conflating remedial and wrongful discharge standards
and laying the foundation for undermining employees' rights under the
ADEA. Second, Section III argues that contrary to the Court's
conclusions, after-acquired evidence litigation comprises mixed-motive
issues because of the lingering influence of prior discriminatory animus.
Third, Section III points out that the BFOQ exception in the ADEA
contraindicates the extent to which McKennon's remedial solution
discounts either established or assumed ageism. As partial support for
this position, the article draws upon the Supreme Court's own
interpretations of both the scope and legislative intent of the BFOQ
exception. Fourth, Section III briefly peers into the future to
prognosticate some evidentiary problems that likely will arise in the
remedial phase of after-acquired evidence litigation. Finally, Section III
then examines the consequences of McKennon's remedial approach and
offers alternatives that are decidedly less burdensome to the
antidiscrimination policy. Section IV summarizes the article, draws some
final conclusions, and attempts to discern a flicker of hope for victims of
discrimination in after-acquired evidence disputes.
II. THE FACTS
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,'1 the Nashville
Banner Publishing Company, which publishes a newspaper entitled the
Banner hired Christine McKennon in the at-will position of "Ad
Taker," in May 1951.12 The Banner's own records revealed that Ms.
McKennon was an excellent employee during her thirty-nine years with
the Banner.1 3 From February 26, 1982, through March 6, 1989, Ms.
McKennon served as secretary for an executive vice president, Mr. Jack
Gunther.1 4  Later she served as confidential secretary for the
Comptroller, Ms. Imogene Stoneking.15 As secretary to Ms. Stoneking,
Ms. McKennon maintained personnel files, helped prepare the annual
budget, maintained petty cash vouchers, prepared time sheets, effected
travel arrangements, controlled employee changes within the personnel
11. 797 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
12. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 605 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)
[hereinafter McKennon 1]. As an at-will employee, Ms. McKennon lacked the job security of a union
employee. Although employers may fire union employees only for just cause, employers have much
greater discretion (though not carte blanche) to fire at-will employees. See infra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text (explaining employer discretion to fire at-will employees).
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department, and performed sundry other tasks that Ms. Stoneking
assigned.16 On October 31, 1990, the Banner removed the sixty-two-
year-old Ms. McKennon, allegedly as part of a cost-driven, reduction-in-
force (RIF) action. 17 Ms. McKennon then sued the Banner, on May 6,
1991, for age discrimination under the ADEA.18 The ADEA prohibits
employers from discharging "any individual or otherwise
[discriminating] against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age."19
While deposing Ms. McKennon in preparation for the ADEA
litigation, the Banner learned that she had engaged in misconduct while
she was secretary to Ms. Stoneking. 20 During her deposition, Ms.
McKennon admitted that she impermissibly photocopied confidential
financial documents to which she was privy, took the copies home, and
showed them to her husband. 21 Furthermore, Ms. McKennon admitted
that the Banner could have fired her whenever it discovered her
misconduct. 22 Armed with this after-acquired evidence, the Banner fired
Ms. McKennon a second time, on December 20, 1991, for unauthorized
removal of confidential documents instead of for a RIF action.23
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 605. Ms. McKennon also sued the Banner under the Tennessee
Human Rights Act. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (1991).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
20. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 605.
21. Id. The confidential documents included the following:
Nashville Banner Fiscal Period Payroll Ledger dated 9/30/89; Nashville Banner
Publishing, Co., Inc., Profit and Loss Statement dated 10/30/89: a note from Elise to
Simpkins, a memorandum from Imogene Stoneking to Irby C. Simpkins. Jr., dated 2/3/89:
a handwritten note dated 2/8; and an Agreement between the Banner and one of its
managing employees (notarized 3/1/89).
Id. at 605-06.
22. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539,541 (6th Cir. 1993).
23. McKennon 1. 797 F. Supp. at 606. Note that after-acquired evidence issues have been and
will likely remain almost exclusively in disparate-treatment litigation.
The United States Supreme Court has divided Title VII litigation into two primary categories:
disparate-treatment (de jure discrimination) and disparate-impact (de facto discrimination). In
addition, the Court divided disparate-treatment litigation into two sub-categories: pretextual and
mixed-motive discrimination. The very basic components of disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
litigation are summarized below.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), as refined by St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993), fashioned a three-stage evidentiary scheme for proving intentional discrimination in pretextual
disparate-treatment litigation. McDonnell Douglas initially set forth the first four stages of the prima
facie evidentiary scheme, where a Title VII plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected
group; (2) she applied for a vacant position with the defendant; (3) she was qualified for that position
and the defendant rejected her; and (4) the defendant continued to seek applications for that position.
McDonnell Douglas. 411 U.S. at 802. Burdine made it clear that once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of pretextual unlawful discrimination, the litigation moves to the second stage where the
defendant-employer must articulate (not necessarily prove) a legitimate reason for the adverse
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Finally, on January 7, 1992, the Banner moved for summary
judgment, based on the after-acquired evidence. 24 To obtain summary
judgment based on the after-acquired evidence, the Banner had to show,
inter alia, that: (1) it would have fired Ms. McKennon had it known of
the after-acquired evidence (the "would have fired" test); 25 and (2)
"the after-acquired evidence . . .establish[ed] valid and legitimate
reasons for the termination of employment .. ".."26 These evidentiary
requirements are intended to dissuade employers from searching
through employees' personnel records for evidence of trivial
misconduct which they would use to establish the after-acquired
evidence defense in discrimination litigation. 27
Ms. McKennon made several relevant arguments in opposition to
the Banner's motion for summary judgment. She argued, for example,
that: (1) the after-acquired evidence defense was applicable only to
cases involving rrsum6 fraud rather than on-the-job misconduct; 28 (2)
even if the after-acquired evidence defense applied to employee's (as
opposed to job-applicant) misconduct, she was justified in removing and
examining the confidential financial documents because she acted in
anticipation of the Banner's unlawful age discrimination. In other
words, her misconduct preceded, anticipated, and related to the Banner's
subsequent violation of the ADEA. According to Ms. McKennon, that
nexus insulated her misconduct from the after-acquired evidence
defense; 29 and (3) the applicability of the after-acquired evidence
defense is, in the first instance, a factfinder's issue.30
personnel decision. 450 U.S. at 254-55. During the third stage of the litigation, the plaintiff may
prevail by proving, that the defendant-employer's reasons were false, i.e., pretextual. Id. at 256.
Subsequently, Hicks held that a plaintiff who merely proves falsity in the third stage, is not entitled to a
directed verdict, because mere proof of falsity does not compel a jury to decide for the plaintiff. 113
S. Ct. at 2747-48. Instead the plaintiff's evidence must establish falsity and link the adverse personnel
decision to a discriminatory animus. Id.
24. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 608.
25. Id.
26. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409. 414 (6th
Cir. 1992)). The court's use of "valid and legitimate" in an at-will setting raises some potential
problems. See infra part III.A.
27. McKennon 1. 797 F. Supp. at 608. Presumably, the court believes these evidentiary standards
will deter employers from searching through employees' files for defenses both during and in
anticipation of discrimination litigation.
28. Id. The district court addressed this issue by noting, inter alia, that other courts have not
distinguished between rdsum6 fraud and on-the-job misconduct. Id. (citing Summers v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988)). Nor did Ms. McKennon persuade the Sixth Circuit
with this distinction. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.. 9 F.3d 539, 541 (6th Cir. 1993)
(stating that both McKennon and Summers involved on-the-job misconduct).
29. McKennon I, 797 F. Supp. at 608. Perhaps Church of Scientology v. Armstrong represents the
threshold of acceptability for this argument. 283 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1991). There, the court held that a
plaintiff-employee of the church was justified in removing incriminating confidential files from the
church and giving them to his lawyer because he reasonably believed that his knowledge of official
misconduct within the church endangered his physical well-being. Id. at 924.
30. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 606 (citations omitted).
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The district court rejected these arguments and held that the Banner
had satisfied the summary judgment standard because Ms. McKennon
failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Specifically, the court held that the Banner established: (1) the nature
and materiality of Ms. McKennon's misconduct (the "did discover"
standard), 31 and (2) that it would have fired Ms. McKennon whenever it
became aware of the misconduct (the "would-have fired" standard). 32
To support the latter factual finding, the court stressed that the president
of the Banner, Mr. Irby C. Simpkins, Jr., signed an affidavit stating that
he would have fired Ms. McKennon immediately upon learning of her
misconduct. 33
Indeed, the affidavit seems to have motivated the court to deny all
relief to Ms. McKennon. 34 The court held: "[i]f a plaintiff has engaged
in misconduct severe enough to warrant termination upon discovery by
the employer, then that plaintiff has no grounds that justify recovery for
her termination." 35 Finally, the court viewed Ms. McKennon's status as
31. Id. at 608.
32. Id.
33. Id. Once the Banner established the nature and materiality of Ms. McKennon's misconduct,
the court was inclined to believe the president of the Banner, Mr. Irby C. Simpkins, Jr. (Mr. Simpkins),
when he claimed that he would have fired Ms. McKennon had he known of the misconduct. See id.
The Court decided McKennon at the summary judgment stage, permitting employers to satisfy their
evidentiary burdens with self-serving testimony. This type of approach is consistent with that
announced in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981), and St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747-48 (1993). See supra note 23.
34. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 606, 608. Two decisions figured prominently in this aspect of
the court's conclusion: Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988) and
Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc.. 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992). See id at 606-08. In Summers, the
employer learned, during discovery, that the plaintiff had falsified approximately 150 records. 864
F.2d at 703. The court relied on that after-acquired evidence to deny the plaintiff all remedial relief.
Id. at 708. In Honeywell, the plaintiff lied about her qualifications for the job, specifically relating to
her college degree, college courses, and job experience. 955 F.2d at 411-12. The Honeywell court
held that under Michigan law an employer's reliance on an employee's false statements constituted
just-cause for her termination and she deserved no relief for the unlawful discrimination. Id. at 414-
16. Both cases effectively concluded that the plaintiffs' misconduct rendered them impervious to
injuries from their employers' unlawful discrimination. See id.; Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
35. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 608 (emphasis added). The court's acceptance of the "would
have fired" standard as reason for denying all remedial relief also suggests that, in the court's view,
Ms. McKennon's misconduct somehow stripped her of her employee status and, hence, of her
standing to sue under the ADEA. See id. Some judges have explicitly adopted this position regarding
r6sum6 fraud, distinguishing it from employee misconduct. See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co..
968 F.2d 1174, 1187-88 (1 th Cir. 1992):
I would hold that within the meaning of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act plaintiff is not a
member of the affected group allegedly discriminated against and is not an "aggrieved"
person. Put differently, Congress did not intend that under the circumstances of this case
a plaintiff is within the protected class. Her status does not give her standing to sue. In
traditional standing language, she is not in the "impact area." She purports to be, but the
status that would place her there was fraudulently obtained and but for her fraud would
have been denied. There is a national policy against discrimination. But the existence of
that policy does not of itself establish that a particular plaintiff has status or standing to
sue. Nor does that national policy depend upon, or envision, implementation or
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a victim of age discrimination to be wholly irrelevant to the remedial
issue .36
B. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S VIEW
Ms. McKennon appealed the district court's decision to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals 37 which, along with several other circuits in
other cases, had held that proof of the after-acquired evidence defense
completely barred plaintiffs from relief under federal discrimination
laws. 38 Before the Sixth Circuit, Ms. McKennon again argued, in vain,
the inapplicability of the after-acquired evidence defense to situations in
which employees' misconduct is linked to unlawful age discrimination. 39
The Sixth Circuit offered at least two reasons for rejecting Ms.
McKennon's position. First, citing Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance,40 the Sixth Circuit explicitly agreed that after-acquired
evidence completely bars a former employee from recovery under the
ADEA where: (1) the employee committed a dischargeable offense, (2)
the offense occurred before the employer imposed the allegedly
discriminatory discipline that triggered the ADEA claim, and (3) the
employer satisfies the "would have fired" standard.4 1 Second, the court
held that the after-acquired evidence defense is equally applicable to
vindication by a false claimant like the plaintiff.
Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting). Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs lose their employee status via their
misconduct, it remains unclear whether federal antidiscrimination laws protect only "employees" from
unlawful discrimination. See. e.g., Alexander v. Rush North Shore Medical Ctr., 851 F. Supp. 330, 332
(N.D. Ill. 1994) ("Doctors ... need not be employed by a hospital to merit protection under Title VII.
A plaintiff-doctor merits Title VII protection if the hospital controlled the doctor's employment
opportunities.") (citations omitted).
36. McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 608 (stating "[tihe nexus argument is irrelevant for the
resolution of this case"). This conclusion became the pivot of the United States Supreme Court's
disagreement with the district court. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
37. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Company. 9 F.3d 539. 541(6th Cir. 1993)
[hereinafter McKennon 11].
38. See Welch v. Liberty Mach. Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403. 1405 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
after-acquired evidence barred any recovery); Washington v. Lake County, 969 F.2d 250, 256-57 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding the same); Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409,415 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding the same); Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 864 F.2d 700,705 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding
the same); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656, 659-61 (D. Utah 1990) (entitling employer
to summary judgment on state wrongful discharge, breach of employment contract, and Utah Anti-
discrimination Act claims due to plaintiff's misrepresentations on employment application). But see
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1222 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding after-acquired
evidence does not bar claim); Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11 th Cir. 1992)
(holding that after-acquired evidence only limits the relief sought).
39. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (listing Ms. McKennon's arguments).
40. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
41. McKennon 11, 9 F.3d at 541-43 (citations omitted). Observe that both the district and the
appellate court focused on the fact that the misconduct constituted a dischargeable offense. Id. at 542;
McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 608. This suggests that those courts might view the after-acquired
evidence defense as being inapplicable to lesser offenses.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
r~sum6 fraud and employee misconduct. 42 The Sixth Circuit opined
further that proof of reasons (2) and (3) justified granting summary
judgment to the Banner. 43 Finally, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
district court that if employers meet the "would have fired" standard,
then plaintiffs are entitled to no relief. In that respect, the Sixth Circuit
stated: "The sole issue in after-acquired evidence cases is whether the
employer would have fired the plaintiff employee on the basis of the
misconduct had it known of the misconduct." 44
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSPECTIVE
In contrast, a unanimous Supreme Court turned to the
antidiscrimination policy as a basis for partially reversing the Sixth
Circuit and the district court's opinions. 45  Specifically, the Court
rejected the propositions that: (1) employers' unlawful discrimination is
irrelevant, 46 and (2) the after-acquired evidence defense bars all relief to
victims of unlawful discrimination. 47 In the Court's view, Summers
accords too little weight to employers' unlawful discrimination, thereby
risking undue frustration of the antidiscrimination policy which seeks to
eliminate age-based employment discrimination.48
The Court offered two basic reasons for this conclusion. First, like
Title VII, the ADEA is an integral part of Congress' statutory scheme to
eliminate employment discrimination in America. 49 Here, the Court
suggested that ignoring employment discrimination is unlikely to deter
it.50 Second, Congress intended for remedial measures under both acts
"to serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-examine and
42. McKennon 11, 9 F.3d at 541-42.
43. Id. at 543.
44. Id.
45. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) [hereinafter
McKennon 1111.
46. Id. at 884.
47. Id. at 883. The Court premised its reasoning on two key assumptions that underlie assessing a
summary judgment motion: (1) that the Banner discriminated against Ms. McKennon because of her
age and (2) that the Banner would have fired Ms. McKennon had it discovered her misconduct
earlier. Id. Also, the Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the Sixth Circuit's proposition that under
the after-acquired evidence doctrine, Ms. McKennon's misconduct was a supervening factor that
justified her removal. Id. at 883-84.
48. Id. at 884.
49. McKennon I11, 115 S. Ct. at 884 (citing Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990.42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S. C. § 158(a)
(1994); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994)). This language strongly suggests that in the
future, the Court will apply the rules in McKennon in after-acquired evidence litigation that arises
under other federal antidiscrimination legislation.
50. Indeed, using after-acquired evidence to bar all relief for an earlier violation would arguably
encourage unlawful employment discrimination. See id.
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to self-evaluate their employment practices and endeavor to eliminate, so
far as possible, the last vestiges of discrimination." 51
Furthermore, the Court suggested that the role which Congress
assigned employees under federal antidiscrimination law makes their just
compensation a key factor in the quest to purge discrimination from the
workplace. 52  This point underscores the obvious nexus between
deterring unlawful employment discrimination and compensating its
victims; 5 3 and it implicitly recognizes the efficacy of elevating the
economic cost of discrimination to employers. 54 By pursuing their own
interests, employees act as private attorneys general, and thereby,
advance the antidiscriminatory policy. 55 Indeed, the Court opined that
even a single employee furthers the antidiscriminatory policy by
revealing a discriminating employer. 56
Finally, with respect to Summers' rationale, McKennon held that
"[a]n absolute rule barring any recovery of back pay . . . would
undermine the ADEA's objective of forcing employers to consider and
examine their motivations, and of penalizing them for employment
decisions that spring from age discrimination." 57 By litigating their
discrimination claims, employees expose "patterns of noncompliance
resulting from misappreciation of the Act's operation or entrenched
resistance to its commands, either of which can be of industry-wide
significance. The efficacy of its enforcement mechanisms becomes one
measure of the success of the Act."58
1. The Fallacy of Analogizing Summers to Mt. Healthy
Furthermore, the Supreme Court pointed out that the court in
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance59 erred by
analogizing Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle (Mt.




54. See id. Although compensation is the chief source of deterrence, other sources exist, i.e.,
adverse publicity and the litigation cost of defending discrimination suits.
55. Id.
56. McKennon 111, 115 S. Ct. at 885. Unfortunately, the McKennon Court's holding
unnecessarily circumscribes employees' relief while helping employers avoid meaningful liability for
their wrongdoing. See id. at 886-87. This deters private attorneys general from fulfilling their critical
roles.
57. Id. at 886.
58. Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
59. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
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Healthy),60 to after-acquired evidence cases.6 1 According to the Court,
Mt. Healthy was a mixed-motive case where both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons motivated the employer at the moment it made the
adverse personnel decision. 62 In after-acquired evidence cases, however,
employers make the initial adverse personnel decisions solely on
illegitimate grounds and later, while fending off discrimination suits
based on those decisions, those employers assert "legitimate,"
apparently pretextual, reasons to justify their earlier discriminatory
decisions. 63 The Court then observed that in mixed-motive litigation,
employers have both a legitimate and an illegitimate reason for their
personnel decisions at the time of discharge. 64 In such cases, plaintiffs
are entitled to limited remedial relief even if illegitimate reasons
contaminated the adverse personnel actions.6 5 The Court adopted this
remedial approach in mixed-motive cases because of: (1) the difficulty
in separating employers' legitimate from their illegitimate reasons; and
(2) the perceived lack of necessity for doing so. 6 6 In short, where it is
difficult to separate the impact of good and bad reasons upon adverse
personnel decisions, the Court gives employers rather than employees
the benefit of the doubt.
2. The Transparency of Clean Hands in the After-Acquired
Evidence Defense
The Supreme Court, in McKennon, rejected the applicability of the
clean hands doctrine where, as in employment discrimination litigation,
"Congress authorizes broad equitable relief to serve important national
policies." 67 The antidiscrimination policy would be ill served "if after-
acquired evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in
60. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, the plaintiff claimed that his employer had violated his
First Amendment right to free speech by denying him tenure for having informed a radio station of the
school district's new dress code. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,282 (1977). The
school district established that it had other legitimate reasons for denying tenure to the plaintiff. Id. at
285. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the plaintiff would have been denied tenure.
absent the public statement. Id. at 287.
61. McKennon i1, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
62. Id.
63. Id. This makes after-acquired evidence cases more akin to pretext litigation where an
employer has only an illegitimate reason for making an adverse personnel decision but fabricates a
"legitimate" reason as a pretext for the decision. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
64. See McKennon Ill. 115 S. Ct. at 885.
65. Id. at 887.
66. Id. at 885.
67. Id. Here the Court, in one breath, explicitly acknowledges Congress' intent to effect broad
equitable relief for victims of discrimination, but, in the next breath, effectively withholds that relief by
applying the "did discover" standard. Id. at 885-86. See infra part III.E. (discussing the shortcomings
of the "did discover" standard).
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termination operates, in every instance, to bar all relief for an earlier
violation of the Act." 68 Having declared the relevance of employers'
unlawful discriminatory conduct in after-acquired evidence disputes, the
Court addressed employees' misconduct.69
3. The Impact of Employees' Misconduct in After-Acquired
Evidence Litigation
McKennon held that employees' misconduct narrows the scope of
remedies available to them in after-acquired evidence litigation. 70 To
support this conclusion, the Court excerpted the following passage from
the ADEA:
[T]he court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation
judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion, or enforcing the liability for [amounts owing to a
person as a result of a violation of this chapter]. 71
With no discussion of the language in this section,72 McKennon
began "balancing" employees' and employers' interests under the
ADEA by observing that "[t]he employee's wrongdoing must be taken
into account .. .lest the employer's legitimate concerns be ignored." 73
The Court then emphasized employers' interests in operating their
businesses and discounted employees' interests in furthering the
antidiscriminatory policy. 74 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the
68. McKennon !11, 115 S. Ct. at 884 (emphasis added). The phrase "in every instance" suggests
that after-acquired evidence as the Court defines it may bar all relief in some cases. Whether after-
acquired evidence bars all relief is likely to turn in the first instance on the egregiousness of the
underlying misconduct. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
69. id. at 886.
70. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b); 626(b) (1994)).
72. As with any statute, the scope and underlying intent of the quoted language is not self-
evident. For example, what type of specific relief may a court appropriately fashion in after-acquired
evidence litigation? And what considerations should a court entertain in answering that question?
73. Id. at 886.
74. McKennon 11, 115 S. Ct. at 886. Employees frequently lose ground when the Court balances
employers' and employees' interests by distributing burdens and presumptions under federal
antidiscriminatory statutes. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2759 (1993)
(Souter, J.. dissenting) (re-balancing employers' and employees' interests, and discarding 20 years of
precedent, by determining that employees who proved their employers lied about the reason(s) for
taking adverse personnel actions no longer established unlawful discrimination, but rather established
only pretext); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (attenuating the
causal nexus in plaintiffs' disparate impact prima facie case by requiring plaintiffs to show a specific
employment practice causes the statistical racial disparity in an employer's work force). Moreover,
Wards Cove re-balanced employers' and employees' interests by reducing employers' burden of
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ADEA seeks merely to regulate discrimination and not the workplace in
general, 75 thus, leaving employers free to exercise "significant other
prerogatives and discretions" when "hiring, promoting and discharging
.. . employees." 76
In the Court's view, employees' misconduct was quite relevant
because of the need "to weigh employers' lawful prerogatives as well as
corresponding equities that arise from the employee's misconduct and
rebound to the employer." 77 Thus, neither the "relative moral worth of
the parties" nor a desire "to punish employees" should influence the
fashioning of remedial packages. 78
4. The Remedial Upshot of McKennon's Conclusions
This reasoning led the Court to fashion a broad remedial rule for
after-acquired evidence litigation: "[A]s a general rule in . . . [after-
acquired evidence litigation] neither reinstatement nor front pay is an
appropriate remedy."7 9 The Court offered several reasons for this rule.
First, it readily acknowledged that the basic purpose of compensating
victims of discrimination is to place them in the position that they would
have occupied but for the discrimination (status quo ante).80 Beyond
compensation, however, it is unclear how the Court intends to handle
liquidated damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages in
establishing business necessity from a burden of persuasion to one of production. Id. at 659; Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228. 244-45 (1989) (determining that consideration of employers'
interest justified relieving employers of all liability if they proved they would have made the same
adverse personnel decision absent discriminatory animus).
75. McKennon 111, 115 S. Ct. at 886. The distinction between regulating discrimination and
regulating the workplace is persuasive so long as discrimination remains sufficiently distinct from
managerial prerogatives, thereby permitting the regulation of the former without unduly encroaching
on the latter. See Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employment:
The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 21 (1995) (discussing the institutionalization of
sexism).
76. McKennon 11, 115 S. Ct. at 886. This observation fails to recognize that these types of
personnel actions are vehicles of ageism in employment, thereby frustrating any attempt to separate
unlawful discrimination from managerial prerogatives. For further discussion on the pervasiveness of
ageism at work, see Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More "Senior") Dog Yet:
The Age-Proxy Theory after Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 391, 394 (1994)
(highlighting that "[tihe ADEA was enacted in response to concerns about the pervasive effects of
arbitrary age discrimination") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Indeed, Congress enacted the ADEA in part because of the pervasiveness of age discrimination
in employment. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, R EPORT OF THE S ECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE C ONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965). Furthermore, at least one commentator has suggested that age
discrimination pervades federal judicial decisions under the ADEA. See Niall A. Paul, Reduction in
Force Early Retirement Incentives and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1989 DET. C.L.
REV. 987, 992 (suggesting that "Congressional intent has been overlooked").
77. McKennon 11, 115 S. Ct. at 885.
78. Id. at 886 (citing Perma Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co.. 424 U.S. 747,764 (1976)).
[VOL. 72:197210
ADEA AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
after-acquired evidence disputes. Second, the Court thought it
"inequitable and pointless to order reinstatement of [employees] the
employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and
upon lawful grounds."81 Here the Court apparently adopted the
"would have fired" standard. However, McKennon was silent as to the
propriety of federal courts injecting wrongful discharge issues into
federal discrimination litigation when discriminating employers raised
those issues. Third, the Court could find no reason to require employers
to ignore dischargeable misconduct after they discover it, "even if [the
information] ...is acquired during the course of discovery in a suit
against the employer and even if the information might have gone
undiscovered absent the suit."82 Here the Court implicitly adopted the
"did discover" standard instead of the "would have discovered"
standard. 83 The unfairness of the "did discover" standard is manifest
under certain circumstances. 84 If, for example, employees steal from
their employers over a considerable period of time, the employers
clearly should discover that misconduct and, perhaps the culprits, by
conducting regular inventory checks. Here, one has absolutely no
reason to give employers the benefit of the doubt that inheres in the
"did discover" standard as opposed to the "would have discovered"
standard .85
Ultimately, the Court offered a somewhat flexible approach to the
issue of back pay. First, it designated the period between the
discriminatory discharge and the discovery of after-acquired evidence 86
as the starting point for calculating back pay.8 7 In other words, if
employees prove unlawful discrimination and employers produce after-
acquired evidence that establishes dischargeable misconduct, then
employees will at least receive back pay for the above-described period.
Beyond that point, courts may consider "extraordinary equitable
circumstances" that affect either party's interests.8 8 Of course, what
constitutes "extraordinary equitable circumstances" is an open question
81. Id.
82. McKennon Iil, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
83. For further explanation of the "did discover" and "would have fired" standards, see Ann C.
McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII
Litigation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 145, 172-75 (1993). See also infra part III.E. for a critique of these
standards.
84. See infra part III.E.
85. See infra part III.G. for further discussion of the "would have discovered" standard.
86. McKennon I11, 115 S. Ct. at 886-87. Because the Court premised its entire opinion on the
need to further the antidiscriminatory policy, there is a question of whether McKennon is fully
applicable to litigation under discrimination statutes that are arguably premised on weaker policies.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 886.
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for lower courts. But a part of the answer could lie in the egregiousness
of either party's misconduct.
III. ANALYSIS
A. PROPRIETY OF AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE SUITS AS FORUMS FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
Without analysis or explanation, the Court in McKennon opined
that: "It would be both inequitable and pointless to order the
reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and will
terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds."8 9  Although
McKennon offered no explanation of what constituted "lawful"
grounds for discipline, courts that speak of "legitimate" 90 reasons for a
discharge often try to premise that conclusion on notions of materiality
and reliance. 91 As a practical matter, those courts have stepped out of
the scope of the ADEA and into the realms of at-will and just-cause
determinations, both of which undergird traditional notions of wrongful
discharge .92
In this respect, McKennon focused on the legitimacy of employers'
reasons for disciplining employees even though those after-the-fact
disciplinary decisions are wholly distinct from any charges of
discrimination in after-acquired evidence litigation. Consequently,
McKennon converts the ADEA from a discrimination shield for
employees into a disciplinary sword for employers. The Court attains
this end by: (1) using the ADEA to resolve wrongful discharge issues
that are at best collateral to discriminatory issues, and (2) penalizing
employees for misconduct that employers discovered after employees
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Courts often use "legitimate." "lawful," and "just cause" synonymously. See, e.g., Duart v.
FMC Wyoming Corp, 72 F.3d 117. 120 (10th Cir. 1995) (determining employees in after-acquired
evidence litigation are not barred from all relief simply because employers discover evidence that
would have justified employees' terminations on "lawful and legitimate" grounds); McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (determining that after-
acquired evidence must establish legitimate reasons for terminating employment, and not finding that
"any or all misconduct during employment constitutes just cause for dismissal") (emphasis added).
91. See McKennon 1, 797 F. Supp. at 608 (stating that "Mrs. McKennon's misconduct, by virtue
of its nature and materiality and when viewed in the context of her status as a confidential secretary,
provides adequate and just cause for her dismissal as a matter of law") (emphasis added).
92. That employers could have legitimately disciplined employees when the misconduct first
occurred does not necessarily mean employers retain that right after they discover the misconduct
during litigation. For example, procedural hurdles might shrink or eliminate employers' authority to
fire employees for "discovered" misconduct that is stale. In that case, a court must focus on either
employers' rights to discipline employees for stale claims or on employees' rights to be free of such
discipline. Social benefit should be a substantial factor in such decisions. In the writer's view, this
proposition is equally applicable to the "legitimate" prong of mixed-motive disputes.
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brought age discrimination claims. The Court adopted this approach to
preserve employers' interests in disciplining their employees.93
However, the nature of after-acquired evidence litigation makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to preserve employers' interests without
heavily compromising employees' interests as well as the scope and
purpose of the ADEA's remedial scheme which is key to realizing the
antidiscriminatory policy of eliminating employment discrimination.94
For example, McKennon's approach obliges employees to protect their
ADEA remedial rights by addressing remote wrongful discharge issues
that can, and most likely will, decimate employees' remedial relief,
regardless of the extent of their discriminatory victimization. Some
discussion of these problems is indicated.
1. The Traditional Definitional and Functional Parameters of
the Terms "Legitimate," "Just Cause," and
"Discriminatory"
Injecting after-acquired evidence into ADEA litigation creates
needless doctrinal pressure and confusion in both discrimination and
wrongful discharge arenas. The stress that after-acquired evidence
places on "legitimacy," and "just cause," smudges the traditional
parameters of those concepts in relation to each other and in relation to
"discriminatory."
The definitions of these terms, and hence, their impact, vary along
the jurisdictional spectrum which ranges from pure at-will jurisdictions at
one end of the spectrum to full just-cause jurisdictions at the other end.
Employers in pure at-will jurisdictions have unrestrained authority to
discharge 95 employees for any reason. 96 Legitimacy or just cause are
93. McKennon 111, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
94. Nor is Congress' model for disciplining employees' misconduct in mixed-motive cases a
justification for applying that approach to after-acquired evidence litigation. See infra notes 143-48.
95. Less clear is employers' authority, under exceptions to the at-will rule, to impose lesser forms
of discipline such as suspensions. See, e.g., Baragar v. State Farm Ins., 860 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (W.D.
Mich. 1994) (recognizing the ambiguity regarding applying the implied contract exception to wrongful
demotion in addition to wrongful discharge) (citations omitted); cf. Mack v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter, 880 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the public policy exception covers
"employee demotions as well as employee terminations").
96. See Magnan Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781, 784 (Conn. 1984) (stating that "[the at-
will] rule, fostered in part by the predominant laissez-faire philosophy of the period, reserved to the
employer absolute power to dismiss the employee, and was considered necessary to preserve the
autonomy of managerial discretion in the work place and the freedom of the parties to make their own
contract") (citations omitted) (emphasis added), MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 9
(1994) (stating that in traditional at-will employment, employees have no legal interest in continued
employment); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment [Alt-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 126 (1976) (stating that the at-will rule contemplates "an indefinite hiring and is terminable
at the will of either party").
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meaningless under pure at-will conditions. Those jurisdictions, however,
are virtually extinct in this country thanks to a complex mix of federal
and state judicial decisions and legislation. 97 Most jurisdictions are
either modified at-will or modified just cause, depending on one's
referential point along the jurisdictional spectrum. 98 In modified at-will
jurisdictions, employers may terminate employees only for those reasons
that either courts or legislatures have not prohibited, 9 9 and the number of
such reasons is declining. 00
In the unionized sector, in traditional wrongful discharge
disciplinary disputes, "legitimate" and "just cause" are long-tenured101
terms of art. In that sector, "legitimate" and "just cause" traditionally
focus only on whether employees' misconduct (or job applicants'
misrepresentations) adversely affect or threaten employers' productive
efficiency,i 02 workmanship, or quality of service. 103 In other words,
unionized employers must solidly link employees' misconduct to
operational efficiency in order to justify discharge.104 And even if
employers establish that nexus, labor arbitrators or other state
administrative tribunals may reinstate employees because of mitigating
circumstances. 105
97. See, e.g., Amy D. Ronner, Case Comment, Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet: The Narrow
Public Policy Exception to the Terminable At-Will Rule. 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565, 569-75 (1984)
(observing that legislation and judicial decisions have at least partially reduced the at-will doctrine in
all jurisdictions). But see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic
Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 689 n.30 (1994) (stating
4fdlespite dramatic changes in the scope of the at-will rule, the rule remains, weakened but alive, in
every United States jurisdiction today.... Even Montana, which has adopted a statutory wrongful
discharge scheme, technically remains an at-will state.") (emphasis added).
98. See generally ROTHSTEIN supra note 96, at 523-88.
99. Id.
100. See Morriss supra note 97, at 689.
101. "Just cause" has been a part of the labor-management landscape at least since the passage
of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
102. FAIRWEATHER, infra note 104, at 225.
103. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (observing that "[tihe
broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship") (emphasis added).
104. See. e.g., OWEN FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 225 (Ray J.
Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed. 1991) (stating "[tihe idea of just cause is that management retains ... the
right to determine discipline, but only so long as such action sustains operational efficiency and is
within the limits of reasonableness determined under the circumstances") (emphasis added); see also
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 65 1-54 (4th ed. 1985) (discussing just
cause).
Courts in after-acquired evidence litigation allude to the just-cause standard by referring to the
materiality of misrepresentations in cases alleging either rdsum6 fraud or employee misconduct. See
supra note 90. If a misrepresentation is material, then it goes to the competence of the applicant to
perform the job in question. Of course the applicant's incompetence undermines the efficiency of the
employer's operations, thereby providing just cause for either rejecting the applicant or firing the
employee.
105. ELKOURI & ELKOuRI, supra note 104, at 653-54.
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On the other hand, in traditional (as opposed to after-acquired
evidence litigation) discrimination litigation, wrongful discharge issues
historically were unconnected to discriminatory issues and were
effectively invisible in that realm. Now courts must grapple with
traditional wrongful discharge issues in after-acquired evidence litigation
and, as the following discussion suggests, must view those concepts in a
somewhat different light.106 In traditional disparate-treatment litigation,
federal courts have extended the "wrongful discharge" definition of
"legitimate" by broadly defining "legitimate" to include any reasons
or motives that discrimination statutes do not proscribe as bases for
employment practices,107 irrespective of the lack of strength (or even the
nonexistence) of a link between those motives and productive efficiency
or workmanship.1 08 Thus, under the ADEA, employment practices are
"legitimate" or "lawful" if they are nondiscriminatory, i.e, if any
reason other than age motivated the employment practices.109 Given the
definitions of "legitimate" in wrongful discharge disputes and under
the ADEA, some definitional overlap in those contexts is clear; 1"0 in both
contexts, "legitimate" recognizes efficiency and workmanship."'
Nevertheless, eventual parametric divergence between "legitimate"
and "discriminatory" is inevitable. In traditional wrongful discharge
cases, "legitimate" embraces only efficiency and workmanship."l 2 But
"legitimate" under the ADEA comprehends not only productive
efficiency and workmanship, but also any factors other than age,
irrespective of how unrelated those factors are to efficiency and
workmanship."1 3 For example, employers may discriminate against
106. See infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
107. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 608 (1993) (stating, "there is no disparate
treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than an
employee's age"); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
(stating "if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant
'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection"') (emphasis
added) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
108. Id.
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) (providing that it is unlawful for employers to discriminate
against employees because of their age).
110. This is true regardless of whether the specific nature of the disparate treatment litigation is
pretextual, or mixed motive. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (stating that the employer must articulate
some "legitimate. nondiscriminatory reason" for the employee's rejection); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (stating that the emphasis on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
in disparate treatment cases "results from our awareness of Title VlI's balance between employee
rights and employer prerogatives").
I l1. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 537 n.l (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(stating that the Merit Systems Protection Board "evaluates such factors as loyalty, trustworthiness, and
judgment in determining whether an employee's discharge will 'promote the efficiency of the
service"'); see also Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 243 (stating that "[tihe broad, overriding interest, shared by
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship").
112. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 104, at 225.
113. See. e.g., Holly v. City of Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220. 231 (N.D. I11. 1985) (finding that
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employees because of nepotism without violating the ADEA. 114 In other
words, while the ADEA and other disparate-treatment discrimination law
recognizes the benefit from insulating productive efficiency and
workmanship from needless erosion,1 15 the ADEA's strongest thrust is to
prohibit employers from discriminating against employees because of
their age. "16 Theoretically, the in-depth inquiry should stop there. The
ADEA and other disparate treatment litigation do not involve detailed
examinations of wrongful-discharge issues such as whether
nondiscriminatory reasons specifically promote productive efficiency
and quality or deprive employees of their job-related property rights.117
2. "Legitimate," "Just Cause," and "Discriminatory" In
After-Acquired Evidence Litigation
However, in after-acquired evidence litigation, under the ADEA,
"legitimate""l 8 does double duty. During the liability phase of that
litigation, "legitimate" assumes the traditional scope of
"nondiscriminatory."'' 9  During the remedial phase, however,
"legitimate" shrinks to the wrongful discharge dimension. Although
federal courts do not explicitly state it, their focus in the remedial phase
is (or should be) whether employers' decisions to fire employees
because of after-acquired evidence comport with exceptions to the at-will
rule in at-will jurisdictions or promote efficiency or workmanship in
just-cause settings. 120 Ultimately, then, legitimate reasons for firing
although evidence of capable performance may show the employers articulated reason is false, it does
not necessarily prove the employer was covering up discrimination, rather it may be nepotism or ill
will).
114. Id. at 231 n.4. Inasmuch as those courts utilize this type of gloss in determining legitimacy in
mixed-motive disputes, one could argue that federal courts should leave it to state courts to assess
whether employers' reasons in mixed-motive disputes are truly "legitimate." Still, a full discussion of
the propriety of federal determination of the true legitimacy of employers' "legitimate" reasons in
mixed-motive disputes exceeds the scope of this paper.
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994) (providing that it is unlawful for employers to discriminate
against employees because of their age).
117. In addition to receiving no mention in federal discrimination statutes, the "property right"
inquiry may be heavily circumscribed in after-acquired evidence litigation because federal
discrimination statutes usually operate where presumptions of at-will employment hang heavy in the
air and, beyond exceptions to the at-will rule, employees serve at their employers' pleasure.
118. Courts seldom use "just cause" in traditional discrimination litigation.
119. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (defining employers'
interests to include efficient and trustworthy workmanship). One could reasonably interpret
McDonnell Douglas to limit employers' legitimate interests to that of efficiency and workmanship,
however, the ADEA and Title VII narrowly define "discriminate." Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
(1994) (prohibiting discrimination "against any individual with respect to ... terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age) (emphasis added) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination "against any individual with respect to ... terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of... race") (emphasis added).
120. See supra part IIIA.1.
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employees under the broader focus of the ADEA may become
illegitimate under the narrower scope of wrongful discharge disputes.121
3. Risks of Skewing States' At-Will Jurisprudence
Federal courts are not compelled to entertain after-acquired
evidence issues and in doing so, risk distorting state's at-will
jurisprudence. The Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Section to Title 28
provides in pertinent part: "The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-(l) the
claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, . . . or (4) in
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction."122 Several reasons suggest that federal courts
should seriously consider dismissing employers' after-acquired evidence
defenses without prejudice and allowing state courts to resolve those
issues.
First, the wrongful discharge claims in after-acquired evidence
litigation are sufficiently "complex" to constitute "compelling"
reasons to dismiss them. At-will employment is nothing if not dynamic,
and employers' rights to fire or otherwise discipline at-will employees
are the subject of much litigation and not a little confusion.123 Many
states have developed several exceptions that have substantially narrowed
the scope of the at-will doctrine. These exceptions include the principle
of good faith and fair dealing,124 expressed and implied employment
contracts,125 and the omnipresent public policy exception.1 26 The scope
of these exceptions is unclear in many states and many state supreme
121. Manifestly, many nondiscriminatory ("legitimate") reasons, such as the color of an
employee's eyes, would be wholly unacceptable as a reason to fire that employee in a just cause
environment. But, that reason would be at least technically acceptable in an antidiscrimination case.
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994).
123. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 96. at 523-88.
124. Id. at 537.
125. Id. at 523-37.
126. Id. at 542-53. See also Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing
State Law: The Employment At-Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 246 (1984).
The author states:
Several legal theories have emerged to justify and delimit the extent of those exceptions.
The mildest and most commonly accepted theory admits the employer's right to arbitrary
discharge with a single caveat prohibiting discharges for reasons contrary to public
policy.... [T]he public policy exception is usually limited to policies that find expression
in a statute or other legislative source. The next most frequently accepted theory is one
of implied contract, found either in the behavior of the parties or in the terms of
employee handbooks and personnel manuals .... The most progressive theories adopt a
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courts have yet to address them directly.1 27 Nor is it clear that the
wrongful discharge issues that arise in after-acquired evidence litigation
are adequately briefed and argued to afford federal courts a solid
position from which to decide those issues. 128 This leaves federal courts
in the position of having to project the future course of at-will
employment jurisprudence in many states. 129 Consequently, when
interpreting states' wrongful discharge at-will jurisprudence, federal
courts may very well leave gaps that ought to have been filled or create
gaps that ought not to have been created.130 As a result, there is the
likelihood that when attempting to resolve the wrongful discharge issues
in after-acquired evidence disputes, federal courts will construe states' at-
will (or just cause) jurisprudence too broadly or too narrowly.131 In
other words, federal courts might misinterpret state law and rely on those
misinterpretations either to deprive employees of federal benefits which
they would have received absent interpretative errors or to award
employees benefits which they would not have received absent
interpretative errors. The parties, as well as state at-will jurisprudence,
will benefit by sending wrongful discharge issues back to state courts
which are better able to develop and predict the course of their own at-
will jurisprudence. In this instance, avoiding piecemeal litigation is
insufficient reason for federal courts to thrust themselves into the
wrongful discharge fray, and risk depriving employees of their federal
rights, only to discover later that had the courts properly interpreted state
law, employees would not have suffered remedial losses.
Second, wrongful discharge issues are at best loosely connected to
the primary issues of discrimination in after-acquired evidence litigation.
Usually, employees sue their employers under both federal
antidiscrimination law and state law. Then the case is often removed to
federal court pursuant to pendent jurisdiction because of the federal
127. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 96, at 523-88.
128. Most after-acquired evidence disputes are resolved at the summary judgment stage with
inchoate evidentiary records.
129. While it is true that accurately projecting state interpretations has been a basic problem with
the Erie Doctrine for some time. the fact remains that where courts are confronted with these
problems, a denial of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
130. Kramer, supra note 126, at 227. The author suggests:
When state law is unclear or rapidly changing, federal courts in diversity jurisdiction
face an awkward predicament. The doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins requires that
they anticipate the law as state courts would decide it. Federal courts, however, are
often reluctant to acknowledge indications of change in state law and tend to avoid
critical reappraisal of older state precedents.
Id. The same can be said of pendent jurisdiction where the state law issue involves rapidly changing
law like that in at-will jurisprudence. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131. Kramer, supra note 126. at 264.
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question.132 Employers raise the wrongful discharge issues when they
offer after-acquired evidence as a justification to their earlier
discriminatory decisions. In after-acquired evidence disputes, wrongful
discharge is neither a counterclaim, an affirmative defense, nor a
liability-related issue. Employers simply offer it almost as an
afterthought. Yet, it is decidedly outcome determinative and effectively
eviscerates courts' earlier determinations of liability against employers.
Third, when federal courts resolve wrongful discharge issues in
after-acquired evidence litigation, they are likely to leave protected
employees worse off under the ADEA and in wrongful discharge
disputes. In other words, McKennon's approach derails the
antidiscriminatory policy, stripping it of substantial efficacy and,
depending on the jurisdiction and thoroughness of federal courts'
analysis, can either add to or subtract from employees' rights under state
laws.133
B. THE MIXED-MOTIVE ISSUE IN AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
LITIGATION
McKennon was only partly correct when it decided that after-
acquired evidence litigation does not fit the mixed-motive model. The
Court correctly concluded that Hopkins134 narrowly defined mixed-
motive decisions to include only those based on both legitimate and
illegitimate factors at the moment employers actually made the
personnel decisions.1 35 Consequently, the Court concluded that the
discriminatory personnel decisions made before employers discover
legitimate reasons (after-acquired evidence of misconduct) are
pretextual136 rather than mixed-motive.137 In other words, although
employers actually made those personnel decisions because of
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.. 31 F.3d 1221. 1233 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing the
impact of federal antidiscrimination legislation on state law employment doctrines).
134. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
135. Id. at 240-41 (stating "[tihe present, active tense of the operative verbs of § 703(a)(1) ("to
fail or refuse"), in contrast, turns our attention to the actual moment of the event in question, the
adverse employment decision") (emphasis added).
136. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. 802 (1973) (discussing pretextual
disparate-treatment litigation). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing intentional
discrimination).
137. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding that an employer must show that it would have
terminated employment even if there were no discriminatory animus). Where discriminatory animus
is not the sole cause of the adverse decision, a mixed-motive case exists. See generally id. at 242
(discussing mixed-motive cases).
1996]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
impermissible factors such as age, they might falsely assert that
legitimate reasons played a part therein. 138
Nevertheless, McKennon's conclusion that after-acquired evidence
disputes contain no mixed-motive issues is erroneous because the
discriminatory animus that triggered the initial discriminatory personnel
decisions does not necessarily subside thereafter.1 39 Discriminatory
animus can percolate time and affect employers' subsequent personnel
decisions, especially where those subsequent decisions affect the same
employees who were subjected to the original discriminatory personnel
decisions.140 Specifically, the original discriminatory animus together
with after-acquired evidence will likely cause employers to claim that
they would have fired employees anyway had the employers been aware
of the after-acquired evidence. Occasionally, as in McKennon,
employers will punctuate their earlier discriminatory decisions by
actually firing plaintiffs anew upon discovering after-acquired evidence.
Thus, we have the very real prospect of a legitimate factor (the after-
acquired evidence) and an illegitimate factor (discriminatory animus that
survived the first decision) combining during after-acquired evidence
litigation to trigger adverse personnel decisions, a classical mixed-motive
situation as defined in Hopkins.141
Given the presence of mixed-motive issues, in after-acquired
evidence disputes, one might seek guidance from traditional mixed-
motive cases such as Mt. Healthy' 42 and from statutory authority such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA of 1991)143 that address remedial
138. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing McKennon's dismissal as part of a
reduction in force).
139. See Brookins, supra note 75, at 27-28 (discussing the resilience of discriminatory attitudes).
140. Id. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258 (determining that for employers to incur liability in mixed-
motive litigation, plaintiffs must establish that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the
challenged personnel decision).
141. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 250-52 (discussing an employer's motives for terminating an
employee).
142. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
143. Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-14 (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1991
prohibits courts from awarding either back pay or reinstatement in mixed-motive cases if employers
establish that they would have made the same adverse personnel decision even absent discriminatory
animus (the same-decision defense). It provides in pertinent part:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation ... and a respondent demonstrates
that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the imper-
missible motivating factor [same-decision defense], the court-(i) may grant declaratory
relief, injunctive relief ... and attorney's fees and costs . . . and (ii) shall not award
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or
payment ....
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The same-decision defense in mixed-motive cases simply
restates the "would have fired" standard in after-acquired evidence litigation. In both cases the




issues in mixed-motive disputes. However, after-acquired evidence
disputes contain an extra component (the elapsed time between the
discriminatory act and discovery of after-acquired evidence) that places
them without the scope of remedial provisions for traditional mixed-
motive disputes.144 Because traditional mixed-motive disputes lack that
time period, the remedial analysis for those traditional disputes is
inapposite to the remedial problems in after-acquired evidence cases. 145
In traditional mixed-motive cases, like Mt. Healthy, legitimate and
illegitimate factors combine to produce the only adverse personnel
decision in the entire dispute.146 Although employers in traditional
mixed-motive cases have both a legitimate and an illegitimate reason for
the decision, the legitimate reason alone arguably would justify the
adverse personnel decision. Therefore, employees in traditional mixed-
motive disputes are not injured by dismissal because legitimate reasons
are supposed to support those actions. But in after-acquired evidence
litigation, the original decisions are premised solely on discriminatory
animus, which does not justify decisions to discipline plaintiffs; therefore
plaintiffs, in after-acquired evidence disputes, are indeed injured because
they were initially fired for unlawful reasons. Presumably, under
McKennon, such injuries continue until judgment is rendered in
subsequent litigation or until employers discover after-acquired
evidence. Consequently, in after-acquired evidence disputes, employees
deserve compensation from the time of their discriminatory removals; 147
"legitimate" reasons that employers subsequently discover cannot erase
the extant harm.
McKennon's remedial formula is, therefore, a step in the right
direction, but it falls short of the mark. McKennon's approach is correct
insofar as it compensates at least some of the extra time period during
144. See, e.g., Georgia Stanaitis, Employee Dishonesty and the After-Acquired Evidence
Doctrine: Why Honesty Is the Best Policy, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 539, 555 (1994) (expressing concern
about courts ignoring the time lapse in after-acquired evidence cases).
145. This reasoning also excludes the Mt. Healthy rationale, because in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell made it clear that the concern about windfalls to plaintiffs loses
much force where, as in after-acquired evidence litigation, discriminatory animus is the sole factor in
an unlawful discriminatory decision. 438 U.S. 265, 320-21 n.54 (1978). The Bakke Court stated:
In Mt. Healthy, there was considerable doubt whether protected First Amendment
activity had been the "but for" cause of [the plaintiff's] protested discharge. Here, in
contrast, there is no question as to the sole reason for respondent's rejection-purposeful
racial discrimination in the form of the special admissions program. Having injured
respondent solely on the basis of an unlawful classification, petitioner cannot now
hypothesize that it might have employed lawful means of achieving the same result ....
Id. at 321 n.54.
146. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing the McKennon Court's application
of Mt. Healthy).
147. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879,886 (1995).
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which plaintiffs endured injuries resulting from unlawful
discrimination.1 4 8 One difficulty with that approach, however, is its
reliance on the "did discover" and "would have fired" standards to
deny employees an opportunity to recover full and fair back pay.14 9
Thus McKennon falls short of the twin goals of compensation and
deterrence which the Court itself acknowledged as being the
cornerstones of the antidiscriminatory policy.15 0
Reference to the CRA of 1991 reveals some shortcomings of
McKennon's approach. In enacting the CRA of 1991, Congress partially
overruled HopkinslSl by imposing liability on employers, even though
they had a legitimate as well as an illegitimate reason for their adverse
personnel decisions.1 52 Congress would hardly impose lighter penalties
on employers whose adverse decisions lacked any semblance of
legitimacy and who quarried "legitimate" reasons only in the wake of
their own unlawful conduct. The discriminatory intent of employers, in
after-acquired evidence disputes, is much clearer and even more
pernicious than that of employers who simultaneously considered
legitimate and illegitimate reasons for their decisions.
Stiffer penalties are warranted to reflect the more blatant and
injurious discrimination that lacks even a colorable justification. The
discrimination is more injurious because at the moment it was imposed, it
was wholly unjustified. Hopkins and the CRA of 1991 gave employers
the benefit of the doubt by accepting the argument that, at the moment
of decision, the legitimate reason would have triggered the same
result. 15 3  From a policy perspective, both of these decisions are
problematic, despite the largely presumed (as opposed to actually
determined) simultaneity of legitimacy and illegitimacy in traditional
mixed-motive litigation.154 McKennon, however, gives employers an
even greater and less tenable benefit of the doubt by accepting, without
thorough examination or proper procedural protections,155 their after-
148. Id.
149. See infra parts II.E.-F. for a more extensive discussion of these problems.
150. McKennon 1II. 115 S. Ct. at 884.
151. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing Hopkins).
152. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). Hopkins exonerated employers
who proved that they would have made the same decision absent any discriminatory animus. Id. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 adopted that aspect of Hopkins and provided for injunctive relief and attorney
fees against employers in mixed-motive litigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994). See also supra note
143 and accompanying text.
153. Before reducing plaintiffs' remedies in traditional mixed-motive litigation, the Court and
Congress should have raised the measure of persuasion from preponderant to clear and convincing
evidence. See Brookins, supra note 75, at 127 (discussing the propriety of the clear and convincing
standard as a measure of persuasion for employers' affirmative defenses in Hopkins).
154. id. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 187-191 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of time restraints on
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the-fact, self-serving claim of what they would have done, now that their
employees have sued them.
C. THE BFOQ EXCEPTION AND AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
LITIGATION
Decision making is the lifeblood of managerial prerogatives, which
in turn are the lifeblood of commerce, literally creating, contouring, and
nurturing it.156 No other single process is more vital to entrepreneurial
success. Given the importance of managerial decision making, freedom
to make those decisions is scarcely less important. Indeed, if decision
making is the essence of the enterprise, then freedom to decide is the
essence of decision making. 157
Despite its importance, managerial decision making, as any other
right, is not absolute. Thus, to eliminate employment discrimination
against older workers, Congress passed the ADEA, which encumbers
managerial decision making, the source of the targeted discrimination. 158
The ADEA prohibits employers from relying on age as a factor in their
managerial decisions. Specifically it declares that:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-() to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age .... 159
This section of the ADEA constitutes a general limitation on
employers' rights to discriminate against individual employees because
after-acquired evidence and associated problems).
156. Peter Francese & Rebecca Piirto, Marketing Smarter: Putting All the Pieces Together, in
1993 DIRECTORY OF MARKETING INFORMATION 24 (American Demographics 1993) (adapted from
CAPTURING CUSTOMERS: How TO TARGET THE HOTTEST MARKETS OF THE '90s) (stating that "business
success ... is determined by the efficiency of the business' decision-making system").
157. See id.
158. See supra note 76 (discussing the pervasiveness of employment ageism). See also HR. Rep.
No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1963) (stating that Title VII seeks "to eliminate, through the
utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment").
159. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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of their age.160 In Hazen Paper Co. v. Bigginsl6l for example, the Court
held:
In a disparate treatment case, liability depends on whether the
protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the
employer's decision. . . .Whatever the employer's decision
making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed
unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in
that process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome.
Disparate treatment, thus defined, captures the essence of
what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very
essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired
because the employer believes that productivity and
competence decline with old age.162
In principle, the prohibition against employers' making age a factor
in their personnel decisions remains inviolate but for one narrow
exception: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization-(1) to take any action otherwise
prohibited . .. where age is a bona fide occupational qualification
[BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business ... "163
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,164 the Court adopted the Fifth
Circuit's165 standards for determining whether an age qualification came
within the BFOQ exception of the ADEA.166 Criswell approved the
following standard: "[T]he 'BFOQ defense is available only if it is
reasonably necessary to the normal operation or essence of defendant's
160. Id. Also, the Court has closely analogized the ADEA to Title VII. Therefore, the Court's
interpretations of Title VII's prohibitions of employment discrimination offer some insight of the
ADEA's. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) (noting that
"[t]he substantive. antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon the prohibitions of
Title VIl").
161. 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993) (emphasis added).
162. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). Although the ADEA's bona fide
occupational qualification, or BFOQ, exception is arguably broader than that under Title VII, the
Court has yet to make much of that difference. Title VII's BFOQ exception permits employers "to
hire and employ," whereas the ADEA BFOQ exception permits employers "to take any action."
where such action is a BFOQ reasonably necessary for operating the business. Compare 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2e(l) (1994) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1994).
164. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
165. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224,235 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.. 408 F.2d 228,235 (5th Cir. 1969)).
166. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,414-15 (1985).
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business."1 67 Thus, Criswell narrowly defined "normal operation" to
constitute the "essence" of a business. Moreover, Criswell approved the
proposition that considerations which trigger the age qualifications in
personnel decisions may not be merely "tangential to the essence of the
business involved;"168 instead, they must constitute the very essence of
the business.169 Finally, in addition to focusing on whether performance
of a job affects the essence of a business, the BFOQ exception requires
that the protected trait (such as age) must interfere with the employee's
ability to perform the essence of her job duties.170
The BFOQ exception establishes at least two facts. First, its mere
existence establishes that Congress clearly did not intend that
"employers . . . change the very nature of their operations in response
to [the antidiscrimination laws]." 171 Second, the narrowness of its scope
as stated and as interpreted, and Congress' decision not to grant similar
exceptions, establishes that the BFOQ exception represents the high water
mark of Congressional tolerance for disparate-treatment employment
ageism.
Several other reasons support these conclusions. First, Congress
explicitly and narrowly defined the type of discrimination that it
intended to protect, i.e., discrimination necessary to preserve the essence
of commerce. Second, Congress explicitly stated that it otherwise
intended to eliminate discrimination, which reasonably means all
discrimination associated with unprotected areas of managerial
prerogatives.1 72 Thus, if management cannot bring a section of its
167. Id. at 407 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Subsequently, the Court specifically stated
that the quoted language was correct. Id. at 421. The Court further noted that the respondent's could
not seriously dispute "that the qualification of good health for a vital crew member is reasonably
necessary to the essence of the airline's operations." Id. at 418 (emphasis added). The Court has also
interpreted the "reasonably necessary" language to mean "essence" under the Title VII BFOQ. In
Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court stated that "[tlhe essence of a correctional counselor's job is to
maintain prison security. A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security,
unclassified penitentiary . . . could be directly reduced by her womanhood." 433 U.S. 321. 335
(1977).
168. Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
169. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 407.
170. The Court has explicitly related the high degree of fit between the nature of the job and the
essence of the business:
[Dliscrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation
would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one point
to another. While a pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that
female stewardesses provide ... in a more effective manner than most men, may ... be
important, [but it is] ... tangential to the essence of the business involved.
Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
171. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989).
172. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1963) (stating that Title VII seeks "to
eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures. discrimination in
employment").
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prerogatives within the BFOQ exception, then any unlawful
discrimination flowing from the exercise of those prerogatives should be
subject to the full weight of the ADEA's remedial provisions in order to
advance the antidiscriminatory policy.1 73 Third, Congress established a
broad array of remedies under the ADEA and gave federal courts
equally broad powers to apply them.174  Because federal policy
explicitly deferred to managerial prerogatives within the BFOQ
exception, it is almost axiomatic that, when managerial prerogatives fall
outside of the BFOQ exception, Congress intended to defer to the
antidiscriminatory policy, e.g., the ADEA. Consequently, outside of the
BFOQ exception, federal courts should not feel free to play Solomon
and "halve the baby;" in that realm employees get the larger portion of
the "baby." This is not to say that federal courts should wholly
discount employers' interest without the BFOQ defense, but they should
discount employers' interests to the extent necessary to fully implement
specific and general deterrence of unlawful discrimination. 175
Juxtaposed with these considerations is that the Banner never offered a
BFOQ defense for its unlawful actions;1 76 yet McKennon effectively
fashioned a remedial shield for arguably unprotected managerial
prerogatives on which the Banner relied to escape most of the liability
for its concededly unlawful discriminatory act.
173. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). This section provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided .... Amounts owing to a person as a result of a
violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That
liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In
any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter,
including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation under this section. Before instituting any action under this
section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the
discriminatory practice or practices alleged ....
Id. See also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.. 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995) (discussing
how remedies will vary from case to case).
175. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 265 (observing that if "an illegitimate criterion was a substantial
factor in an adverse employment decision, the deterrent purpose of [Title VIII has clearly been
triggered") (O'Connor, J., concurring); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221. 1233 n.20
(3d Cir. 1994) (stating that "[wihile the federal anti-employment discrimination laws were not
designed to impinge directly upon employer free choice, indirect effects are inevitable").
176. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that McKennon's removal was allegedly
due to a reduction-in-force).
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D. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
LITIGATION
1. Presumptions in After-Acquired Evidence Disputes
McKennon offered no specifics with respect to evidentiary standards
in after-acquired evidence litigation. However, evidentiary and policy
issues will surface in this area. In Russell v. Microdyne Corp.,177 for
example, where the employer discovered after-acquired evidence that the
plaintiff lied on her rdsum6, the court stated that a prima facie case of
age discrimination triggered nothing "more than a presumption of a
right in the plaintiff to the remedy of employment and backpay, a
presumption which was subject to being defeated by proof by the
preponderance of the evidence on the part of the defendant that the
plaintiff would not have been hired anyway if there had been no
discrimination."178 Arguably, McKennon also raises a presumption that
plaintiffs are entitled to remedial relief upon presenting a prima facie
case of discrimination. 179 Even so, issues remain as to the strength and
the role of policy, e.g., the antidiscrimination policy, in the presumption
of entitlement to remedial relief. In other areas of federal discrimination
law, the Court has consistently relied on Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence1 80 to weaken presumptions that favor employees and to shield
employers from burdens of persuasion. In St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,181 for example, the Court followed Rule 301:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes
on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial
upon the party on whom it was originally cast. 182
177. 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
178. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir 1995) (emphasis added). Observe
that the court addresses only the remedial issue and not the liability issue which involves a different
evidentiary scheme in pretextual analysis, as well as in mixed-motive analysis. See id. at 1240-41.
179. See Hopkins. 490 U.S. 244-45. 252-53 (noting that after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to prove that it would
have made the same adverse personnel decision absent the discriminatory animus).
180. FED. R. EvD. 301.
181. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
182. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting FED.
R. EVID. 301). Cf. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680,687-88 (1945) (determining that
once plaintiffs established violations, the burden of proof shifted to defendants to rebut the
presumption that plaintiffs were entitled to full remedial relief).
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If the Court adopts Hicks' approach, then federal courts will shift
the burden of production (rather than assign the risk of
nonpersuasion)l 8 3 to employers regarding the "would have fired"
standard in after-acquired evidence cases. 184 The ease with which
defendants have been allowed to satisfy their burdens of production in
the past could be ominous for plaintiffs in the remedial phase of after-
acquired evidence litigation. Presently, after-acquired evidence rebuts
the presumption of entitlement to remedies such as front pay,
reinstatement, and some back pay.185 Moreover, McKennon relegated to
another day the development of an analytical paradigm for determining
eligibility for any extra back pay or damages in after-acquired evidence
cases.
186
Another potential evidentiary problem is that McKennon placed no
limit on the age of after-acquired evidence that could be used to rebut
the presumption. Clearly some time limit is indicated here. Courts
usually impose time limits to bar stale evidence to which opposing
parties may have little or no defense because any evidence that
opponents might have had probably will have disappeared.' 8 7 Also,
placing time limits on after-acquired evidence should make employers
more vigilant.' 8 8 Still, the nature of some types of misconduct will
render them impervious to the staleness argument because they are
continuing violations and constitute a constant threat to efficiency and
workmanship.189
Professor Shulman offered additional reasons for placing time
limits on evidence that employers may use for disciplinary purposes.
Regarding time limits within which employers may fire employees for
r6sum6 fraud, Professor Shulman stated:
183. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 463-64 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (supporting
shifting the burdens of persuasion and the production where policy dictates).
184. Cf. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (increasing the
employees' burden when using statistics by requiring plaintiffs to show a causal relationship between
the employer's employment practice in question and the exclusion of a particular protected class). But
see Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 n.1ll (Ilth Cir. 1992) (stating that "[the
employer bears the burden of persuasion to show by a preponderance of the evidence whether and in
what manner after-acquired evidence would have legitimately altered the employment relationship
and hence should affect Title VII relief under the approach prescribed").
185. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879.886 (1995).
186. Id. (noting that an absolute bar to recovery of backpay would undermine ADEA objec-
tives).
187. On the other hand, if misconduct is too old for employees to defend, then it might be too old
for employers to prove, nevertheless, courts place some time limit on stale claims.
188. Increased vigilance by employers is, however, a double-edged sword, since it could cause
increase scrutiny of minorities. See infra part III.F.
189. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
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Is [the employee] subject to discharge for time without limit so
long as he remains in the employ of the Company? That
would surely be a harsh -and unjust rule .... But a rule that the
employee guilty of such falsification is subject to discharge for
a reasonable period after the employer first learns of the
falsification, whenever that may be, would also be unduly harsh
and capricious. It, too, would provide for no definite time
limit. In addition, it would put a premium on the employer's
failure to ascertain the truth. And the fate of employees
similarly situated would depend entirely upon the pure chance
of when the employer happened to learn of the falsification....
The principle is recognized not merely in order to encourage
diligence on the part of the . . . [employer] and to direct
energies to the relative present rather than to the remote past,
but also as a measure of justice to the guilty person whose
offense . . . should not render him permanently insecure. 190
If one can move beyond contractual and efficiency concerns, which
is difficult to do, then equity does not necessarily demand that
employees who committed wrongs in the distant past and who became
productive workers should pay for those wrongs the remainder of their
lives by living in constant fear of retribution.
Excessive delay in after-acquired evidence litigation is a particularly
problematic example of favoritism because employers "can drag their
feet" in discovering and presenting after-acquired evidence that solely
defends their own federal violations. In contrast, employees must assert
ADEA claims within a relatively narrow period or forfeit their rights to
assert the claims. 191 Thus, in after-acquired evidence disputes, employers
operate under different and more favorable rules than employees.
Even if after-acquired evidence is timely, there is the question of
how persuasive it must be to overcome the presumption that plaintiffs
190. Harry Shulman & Neil W. Chamberlain, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 467 (1949). At least
two theories play a part in rules that govern the time limits with respect to rsum=6 fraud. Some argue
that r~sumd fraud has an inordinately large moral or ethical component because applicants
deliberately misrepresent material information about themselves. Consequently, they never were
entitled to the jobs in the first instance and employers never can trust them. See infra note 243 and
accompanying text. The other theory is that resumd fraud is largely irrelevant unless a nexus exists
between the subject matter of the misrepresentations and job applicants' prospective duties. See, e.g.,
In re United States Dep't of Labor, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 250, 256-57 (1983) (finding that
although the grievant falsified her employment application by omitting her prior employment as a
clerk, the falsification was unlikely to adversely affect the grievant's job performance).
191. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d)-(e) (1994) (discussing time limits for filing claims with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing civil actions).
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who prove unlawful discrimination are entitled to remedial relief.192 If
that presumption has a heavy policy component (and it should), then
courts should require defendants to produce clear and convincing
evidence that after-acquired evidence exists and that plaintiffs would
have been fired upon discovery of such evidence. 193 To the extent that
courts treat the "would have fired" standard as an affirmative defense,
then it becomes somewhat analogous to the same-decision defense in
mixed-motive litigation.194 The analogy may not prevail, however,
because McKennon explicitly (and perhaps hastily) rejected the
proposition that after-acquired evidence cases are analogous to mixed-
motive cases like Mt. Healthy.195 But, as this author has argued, the
motives become mixed during the second decision where employers rely
on after-acquired evidence to claim that, but for their ignorance of the
after-acquired evidence, they would have fired the plaintiffs.196
Consequently, the "would have fired" defense becomes functionally
identical to the same-decision defense that Mt. Healthy announced.1 97
Time limits would help provide the federal courts with a jurisprudential
yardstick with which to evaluate the "would have fired" defense.
Although McKennon endorsed the "would have fired" test, the
Court mentioned neither the measure of persuasion nor the situs of the
burden of persuasion for that test. 198 Nonetheless, the Court could
remove any doubt here by adopting Hopkins' approach to the same-
decision defense' 99 which Congress subsequently adopted, with some
remedial modifications, in the CRA of 1991.200 Under Hopkins, courts
192. See supra part III.A.
193. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text (arguing that after-acquired evidence
disputes are highly likely to harbor mixed-motives); see also Brookins, supra note 75 (noting the
propriety of requiring employers to prove their affirmative defenses, in mixed-motive disputes, by
clear and convincing evidence). But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1989)
(rejecting the plaintiffs request to impose a clear and convincing standard to the defense that the
employer would have made the same adverse decision absent discriminatory animus).
194. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 252-53 (determining that preponderant evidence sufficiently
established the same-decision defense).
195. See supra part II.C.1 (discussing McKennon).
196. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text (discussing after-acquired evidence and
mixed motive disputes).
197. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (endorsing the same-
decision defense in mixed-motive disputes under the Constitution).
198. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886-87 (1995). Language in
McKennon suggests that the Court places the burden of persuasion on employers with respect to the
"would have fired" test. Id. "Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact
would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the
discharge." Id. at 887. Given the Court's track record regarding the nature of employers' evidentiary
burdens, employees have little reason for optimism here. See supra note 74 (discussing the Court's
approach in civil rights).
199. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228. 258 (1989).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)(2)(B) (1994) (containing the same-decision defense
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would oblige employers to treat the "would have fired" standard as an
affirmative defense for which employers would have the full burden of
persuasion. 20 1 Because of the self-serving nature of evidence offered in
support of the "would have fired" standard and the strength of the
policy favoring compensation of victims of discrimination, the measure
of persuasion for the "would have fired" standard should be clear and
convincing rather than preponderant.
E. CONSEQUENCES OF McKENNoN's REMEDIAL STANDARDS
1. The "Did Discover" and "Would Have Fired" Standards
McKennon adopted the "did discover" and "would have fired"
standards to resolve remedial issues in after-acquired evidence
litigation.202 This section discusses the consequences of that selection on
the remedial rights of victims of discrimination under the ADEA.203
Employers create uncertainty when they initially discriminatorily
fire employees without knowledge of the employees' previous
dischargeable misconduct. The uncertainty involves whether employers
would have fired employees earlier and legitimately had the employers
known of prior dischargeable misconduct. Even more uncertainty
surrounds whether employers would have discovered the earlier
misconduct but for the antidiscrimination litigation that arose from their
own misconduct.
The "did discover" and "would have fired" standards fail
respectively to address that uncertainty. By glossing over the
uncertainty, the "did discover" and "would have fired" standards fully
and directly skew the amount and type of relief that employees receive
under the ADEA.204 At the outset, the "did discover" standard focuses
provisions). See also supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of the CRA of 1991
in response to Hopkins).
201. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258. As pointed out earlier, the "would have fired" standard is
functionally identical to the same-decision defense. See supra note 197. Also both Congress (in the
CRA of 1991) and the Court (in Hopkins) recognized the same-decision defense as an affirmative
defense for which employers have the burden of persuasion. See supra note 152. Thus, the CRA of
1991 is instructive on the issue of the type of burden employers should carry to satisfy the "would have
fired" standard in after-acquired evidence cases.
202. McKennon II1, 115 S. Ct. at 885-86.
203. As previously mentioned, the usual scenario in after-acquired evidence disputes is: (I)
employers discriminatorily fire employees; (2) those employees file discrimination suits; (3) during the
litigation employers discover that plaintiffs committed dischargeable offenses; (4) employers then
present that misconduct to the court together with evidence that they would have fired plaintiffs earlier
but for the employers' ignorance of the misconduct; and (5) consequently, the court denies plaintiffs
either all or most of the available relief. See supra part II.A (discussing McKennon facts, which are
typical of after-acquired evidence cases).
204. McKennon III. 115 S. Ct. at 885-87.
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attention in the wrong direction by addressing what employers did find
as a result of the litigation. In effect, the "did discover" standard
permits (indeed encourages) employers to use the "skeletons" of their
own lawlessness as a platform to search for "bones" in employees'
"closets." In short, the "would have fired" standard virtually elicits
employers' self-serving claims based on the after-acquired evidence.
In addition, these standards permit employers to "win" irrespective
of whether employees sue for unlawful discrimination. If employees sue
for unlawful discrimination, these standards will shield employers from
virtually all liability. Here employers win in the sense that they
discriminatorily remove unwanted employees and avoid the brunt of
attendant remedial consequences. If, on the other hand, employees do
not sue, the employers stand in even better stead.205
2. "Did Discover" and "Would Have Fired" Standards
Contradict Precedent
More importantly, remedial precedent contraindicates using
standards that tend to leave plaintiffs who have prevailed on the merits
virtually remediless. 20 6 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery C0.207 is
instructive here. In Anderson, the defendant employer violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act 208 by failing to keep accurate records of
employees' outstanding wages. 209 The plaintiff had also failed to keep
accurate records of his own, and thus, could not establish the amount of
back wages that the employer owed him.2 10 He did establish the
existence of the debt, however. 211 The Court acknowledged the
difficulty of determining the quantum of wages under those uncertain
circumstances. 2 12 Still, it determined the amount of back pay and noted
that a difficult assessment was insufficient reason to deprive the plaintiff
of his remedy. 213
Regarding plaintiffs' evidentiary burdens in remedial phases of
litigation, Anderson opined that after an employee establishes the
205. A third scenario, of course. is that employers are deterred from discriminating in which
case they also win because they continue to receive contractual services for contractual wages.
206. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 688 (1946) (stating that the nature
of the Fair Labor Standards Act and public policy militate against making the employee's burden of
proof too difficult).
207. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
208. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994).
209. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680,687 (1946).
210. Id. at 689.
211. Id. at 689-90.
212. Id. at 693.
213. Id. at 687.
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existence of the debt, the burden shifted to the employer either to rebut
the plaintiff's evidence or to establish the precise amount of work that
the plaintiff performed. 214 Finally, Anderson held that should the
employer fail to establish the amount of the debt, the Court would award
the plaintiff approximate damages, so long as the evidence supported an
inference about the amount. 215
Anderson reaffirms that defendants should not benefit from their
illegal acts. Although the plaintiff in Anderson was an innocent party,
contrary to plaintiffs in after-acquired evidence disputes, 216 defendants
in both Anderson and McKennon were wrongdoers, created confusion as
to the measure of the remedy, and stood to profit from their illegal
acts. 2 17 Yet, Anderson ventured to estimate the amount of damages,
rather than to tolerate the defendant's profiting from his unlawful
acts. 2 18  Moreover, the strength of the antidiscriminatory policy
somewhat offsets plaintiffs' misconduct in after-acquired evidence cases.
3. Use of "Did Discover" and "Would Have Fired"
Standards Convert ADEA into Wrongful Discharge Statute
The "did discover" and "would have fired" standards effectively
convert the ADEA from a piece of remedial social legislation intended to
remove discrimination and penalize discriminatory employers into a
shop-floor disciplinary rule that penalizes employees. The purpose of
the ADEA is to eliminate the public scourge of employment
discrimination, 2 19 rather than the private problem of employee
misconduct, especially when addressing the latter causes underdeterrence
of the former. 220  The goal should be to discipline unlawful
discrimination to the extent necessary to remove it from our midst while
preserving employers' prerogatives as much as possible consistent with
214. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687-88.
215. Id. at 688.
216. But the strength of the antidiscriminatory policy in after-acquired evidence litigation would
tend to resolve some doubts in favor of plaintiffs and to that extent reduce either the need to penalize
their misconduct or reduce the magnitude of any penalties imposed.
217. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688; McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879,
88-83 (1995).
218. Anderson. 328 U.S. at 688. See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251,264-65
(1946) (finding it improper to allow a wrongdoer to profit because plaintiff could not prove the precise
amount of damages). The Bigelow Court noted that "'[t]he constant tendency of the courts is to find
some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been done. Difficulty of
ascertainment is no longer confused with right of recovery' for a proven invasion of the plaintiff's
rights." Id. at 265-66 (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1930)).
219. McKennon 111, 115 S. Ct. at 884.
220. See id. (stating that the statute does not constrain employers from exercising significant
discretion in the course of the hiring, promoting and discharging of their employees).
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removing the scourge that they created.221 As McKennon points out,
courts should not use the ADEA as a general regulation of the
workplace; 222 yet, most disciplinary rules generally regulate the
workplace. Nothing in either the ADEA or its legislative history suggests
that Congress intended for courts to use that statute as a disciplinary rule
under the unique circumstances of after-acquired evidence disputes. 223
Finally, if the Court insists on using the ADEA as an internal
enforcement mechanism for the shop (despite the impropriety of that
approach), a less restrictive approach is simply to deny reinstatement 224
and permit employees to establish their entitlement to front pay as well
as any other remedy under the ADEA.225
The purpose of the remedial phase in discrimination litigation is to
place employees where they would have been but for their employers'
unlawful discrimination (status quo ante). 226 But to achieve that goal,
courts must make some kind of informed determination as to where
employees would have been but for the discrimination. The "did
discover" standard will not accomplish that goal. That standard flatly
assumes, without apparent justification, either of two perspectives: (1)
that employers would have discovered the misconduct when they in fact
did discover it, during the litigation; or (2) when employers actually
would have discovered the misconduct is somehow irrelevant; that they
did discover the misconduct during the litigation is all-important.
For several reasons both perspectives lie uneasily with the make-
whole purpose of the ADEA's remedial structure. First, these
perspectives substitute fortuity for reality-when, if ever, would
employers have discovered the misconduct? 227 Second, (perhaps on the
basis of a theory of implied waiver), at least some courts clearly exclude
after-acquired evidence of which employers were aware before
discriminating against employees. 228 If it is unacceptable for employers
221. See id. See also supra note 74 (stating that employees frequently lose ground when the
Court balances their interests against those of employers).
222. McKennon IlI. 115 S. Ct. at 886.
223. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between after-
acquired evidence disputes and mixed-motive disputes). Congress clearly intended to penalize
employees' misconduct in mixed-motive disputes. However, just as clearly, mixed-motive and after-
acquired evidence disputes are quite distinguishable from a remedial perspective.
224. In most after-acquired evidence disputes, the cost of reinstatement to employers and to
employee-employer relationships probably will outweigh the benefits to employees, all of whom must
function as an integral part of those relationships. See generally 2 DAN B. DOBBs, LAW OFREMEDIES
213 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing problems with reinstatement between employee and employer).
225. See id. (pointing out the propriety of front pay in civil rights litigation where reinstatement is
probably unworkable).
226. See McKennon III. 115 S. Ct. at 886.
227. See infra note 252 (providing an example of a case in which the employer demonstrated that
they would have discovered the employee's misconduct).
228. See, e.g., Jackson v. Integra Inc., 1994 WL 379305, at *2 (10th Cir. July 21, 1994)
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to rely on misconduct of which they actually had prior knowledge, then
is it not at least equally unacceptable for them to rely on misconduct
about which they otherwise would have remained ignorant? Third, the
Eleventh Circuit made a potent point in Wallace v. Dunn Construction
Co.,229 by stating that the "did discover" standard leaves protected
employees worse off than they would have been but for their minority
status. 230 That point contains two persuasive components: first it is true;
second, the outcome that the court in Wallace observed flies in the face
of the fundamental purposes of the ADEA and other federal
antidiscrimination legislation-to prevent protected persons from
employment discrimination because of their minority status.231
F. DUE DILIGENCE AND THE "DID DISCOVER" STANDARD
Nevertheless, if courts insist on applying the "did discover"
standard in after-acquired evidence litigation, then they should also
apply the due diligence standard. 232 One court has opined that the
"purpose of the due diligence requirement ...is to ensure that failure
to produce [witnesses] ...was not due to indifference or a strategic
preference for presenting [the witnesses'] testimony in the more
sheltered form of . . .minutes rather than in the confrontational setting
of a personal appearance on the stand." 233 Similarly, a due diligence
standard, in after-acquired evidence cases, helps to ensure that employers
make reasonable efforts to discover employees' misconduct before
firing them for discriminatory reasons. That kind of effort would at
least spare the judicial time and effort needed to unravel after-acquired
evidence issues. Also, if full and accurate information is valuable to
employers, then the due diligence standard should not substantially
increase their burden because the incentive to scrutinize employees and
applicants would already exist.
(observing that "to bar relief based on after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct ... merely
requires proof that . . .the employer was unaware of the misconduct when the employee was
discharged") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
229. 968 F.2d 1174 (11 th Cir. 1992).
230. Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1179 (11 th Cir. 1992).
231. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (comparing portions of the text of the ADEA
and Title VII).
232. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades. 491 F. 2d 402, 409 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that
"[tihe cases [applying Rule lOb-5 of the securities regulations] generally hold that before an insider
may claim reliance on a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure, he must fulfill a duty of due care
in seeking to ascertain for himself the facts relevant to a transaction"); see also FED. RULE CIV. P.
60(b)(2) (granting relief "from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could ... not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b)") (emphasis added).
233. Rosario v. Kuhlman, 839 F. 2d 918, 925 (2d Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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In addition, due diligence will have the following effects in after-
acquired evidence litigation: (1) avoid needlessly stripping plaintiffs of
their remedial rights under the "did discover" standard; (2) discourage
employers from accumulating data on minority employees, holding that
data for future litigation, and presenting it during discovery as newly
acquired evidence; 234 (3) discourage employers from using after-
acquired evidence to force employees to either settle or withdraw their
discrimination claims; and (4) work in tandem with the requirement that
employers must have been objectively unaware of the misconduct.235
The due diligence standard examines not only whether employers
actually knew about after-acquired evidence before the litigation, but
also whether they should have known about after-acquired evidence
before the discrimination litigation. 236 That standard also helps to
ensure that employers use timely relevant evidence (instead of
discriminatory animus and pretext) as a basis for disciplining employees.
The harsh effects of after-acquired evidence on employees' remedial
rights and on the antidiscriminatory policy justify requiring employers
to exercise reasonable care in searching for evidence of misconduct or
misrepresentation before discrimination suits arise. 237 That burden is a
quid pro quo for the privilege of presenting after-acquired evidence
during the litigation.
1. Shortcomings of the Due Diligence Standard
As any other standard, due diligence has shortcomings. First, to
promote uniform results and fairness when applying the due diligence
standard, courts should carefully compare each employer to similarly
situated employers. To determine the acceptability of employers'
diligence, courts should assess circumstances such as industrial standards,
the firm's financial integrity, and the availability of more productive
surveillance and investigatory systems. Second, ironically, the due
diligence standard may encourage employers to rummage through
minority employees' files in search of incriminating evidence. The
234. See Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1180-81.
235. To date, the author is unaware of any court that holds employers to an objective standard
that focuses on whether they should have known (as opposed to whether they did know) about the
after-acquired evidence before the litigation.
236. See Byers v. Burleson, 713 F.2d 856,861 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that summary judgment is
inappropriate when applying the discovery rule "if there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
when, through the exercise of due diligence, the plaintiff knew or should have known of her injury").
237. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235-36 n.25 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating
that "many employers in fact responsibly investigate applicants across-the-board before hiring
someone, and that the employer's need for truthful employment applications has been sharpened with
the spread of employer liability for 'negligent hiring.').
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Third Circuit announced one answer to that type of abuse, however. In
Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., 238 the court stated:
[I]n a normal Title VII or ADEA case, evidence acquired
before the adverse employment decision might, as a
prophylactic measure, be inadmissible altogether if . . . the
employer had a practice of thoroughly investigating the
information provided in employment applications and
interviews by, and of comprehensively reviewing on-the-job
performance of, only or primarily only the members of a
protected class with the motive to discover flaws justifying an
adverse employment action . . . . [S]uch evidence [arguably]
should be excluded from consideration as the fruits of unlawful
retaliation even in the remedies stage of a Title VII or ADEA
suit. . . . [E]xcept perhaps to show that reinstatement would
threaten the public health, safety, or welfare, or would otherwise
violate a public policy on par with the one antithetical to
employment discrimination.239
Finally, in as much as other theories of claim such as negligent hiring or
retention 240 already oblige employers to be more vigilant, one might
overestimate the effect of due diligence in after-acquired evidence
disputes.241
2. Types of Misconduct and Due Diligence
Detectability also plays a part in both due diligence determinations
and staleness of evidence. 242 Detectability is a function of patency and
latency. The more patent the misconduct the more detectable it is and
the easier it becomes to hold employers responsible for not discovering
it before they took adverse personnel actions against employees. Of
course, the reverse also is true.
238. 31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994).
239. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 n.31 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added).
240. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1187 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he
employer is at risk of suits for harm to the public on respondeat superior or negligent hiring grounds
and for workmen's compensation liability to other employees and the employee herself").
241. See Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1235 n.25 (noting that increased employer liability for negligent
hiring has heightened the employer's need for truthful applications). Then the court correctly
observed that "[an employment-discrimination suit brought by a discharged employee or unsuccessful
applicant, however, does not provide a sound business (as opposed to litigation) reason for the
employer to begin investigating its ex-employee's or applicant's honesty and fidelity." Id.
242. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for time limits
on after-acquired evidence.
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Misconduct spans the continuum from patency to latency.
Misrepresentations about one's age on a r6sum6 or fighting on the job
are quite detectable. In contrast, misrepresentations such as
embezzlement are latent and difficult to detect. And misrepresentations
about one's work history 243 or misconduct such as theft fall somewhere
in the middle of the continuum. Theft, for instance, is not necessarily
highly detectable, but, with due care, e.g., careful physical inventorying,
employers have a high probability of preventing theft and similar types
of misconduct that leave "tracks" in the ordinary course of business
operations.
Also, the continuity of misconduct affects detectability and the
acceptability of old or stale misconduct. Some types of
misrepresentations, for example, create continuing threats to efficiency
and workmanship because time does not diminish the risk that they
create to those factors. Examples of such misrepresentations include lies
about professional licenses or other training that is essential to competent
performance. 244  Still, the continuing nature of these types of
misrepresentations arguably reduces the difficulty of detecting them
through due diligence. Moreover, in many, if not most instances, the
enduring nature or effect of misconduct militates against the force of
employees' claims that these continuing violations are too old or stale
for consideration.
Superimposed on each of the previously mentioned types of
misconduct is the seriousness of the behavior. Seriousness addresses the
extent to which the misconduct impacts productive efficiency and
quality of the product and arguably can diminish the rigor with which a
court applies the due diligence standard. However, in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,245 the Court effectively, if not
explicitly, held that even particularly egregious misconduct does not
243. Beyond the patency or latency of misconduct lies an additional moral or ethical stigma
associated with the mere fact of falsification. See, e.g., Cadena v. Department Of Justice, No.
DA075209047, 1980 MSPB Lexis 251, *45 (Merit Systems Protection Board Sept. 30, 1980) (stating
that the appellant was "clearly on notice from the outset that full and truthful disclosure of prior arrests
and convictions was a pre-condition of his employment. His performance in the position to which he
was appointed as a result of falsification of employment documents has no relevance to the
falsification charge.") (emphasis added). Irrespective of the length of an employees' tenure with an
employer, the "pre-condition" approach to r6sum6 fraud calls for his removal. In this respect rdsum6
fraud is tantamount to a continuing violation. Several circuits have adopted a similar approach to
r6sum6 fraud in after-acquired evidence litigation. See, e.g., Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins..
864 F.2d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that "after-acquired evidence ... does itself preclude the
grant of any present relief or remedy to [the plaintiff]"). This writer has yet to find a court that has
held, in an after-acquired evidence dispute, that truthfulness on r6sum6s is a precondition to
employment, but they effectively assume that position regarding both employee misconduct and
r6sum6 fraud.
244. See Summers 864 F.2d at 708 (offering the hypothetical of a charlatan doctor).
245. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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necessarily side track the make-whole principle. 246 Nevertheless, all of
the foregoing are shortcomings with which courts have experience, and
consequently, one supposes that courts can apply the due diligence
standard with profit in after-acquired evidence cases.
G. THE PROPRIETY OF THE "WOULD HAVE DISCOVERED" STANDARD
IN AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE DISPUTES
Relative to the "did discover" standard, the "would have
discovered" standard does more to advance equity and preserve reality
between employers and employees. The heart of the Gordian knot in
after-acquired evidence disputes is that both parties are wrongdoers. 247
Consequently, by penalizing one party's misconduct, the Court appears
to (and arguably does) implicitly condone the other party's misconduct.
For example, by applying the "did discover" standard, the Supreme
Court discounted two essential facts: (1) the Banner discovered Ms.
McKennon's misconduct solely because of its own federal violation and
(2) the Banner might never have discovered that misconduct but for
attempting to defend its own.
Several other problems also demand attention. First, even if the
Banner would have eventually discovered the misconduct absent the
lawsuit, how much time would have passed before it made that
discovery? And how much time must pass before courts properly bar
after-acquired evidence? 24 8  These issues are profoundly outcome
determinative in after-acquired evidence litigation. Furthermore, given
the weight of policy considerations that hang in the balance, these issues
demand a balanced, equitable resolution. The "would have discovered"
standard either directly or indirectly addresses these issues; the "did
discover" standard wholly ignores them.
In contrast, the major shortcoming of the "would have discovered"
standard is that it obviously burdens the Banner more than the "did
discover" standard.2 49 But at least three reasons justify that burden.
First, as already mentioned, other standards (such as the "did discover"
standard) unduly favor either employers or employees. Second, given
the complexity of the labor-management relationship 250 and the need to
246. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 (1976). See also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (refusing to deprive the plaintiff of an opportunity
to recover damages under Title VII even though the plaintiff engaged in a blatantly illegal stall-in
against his employer).
247. See infra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
248. See supra part III.F. (discussing the importance of avoiding stale after-acquired evidence).
249. See supra part III.E. and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the "did
discover" standard).
250. See E. EDWARD HERMAN, ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ANDLABOR RELATIONS 4 (3d ed.
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avoid creating other problems while resolving discrimination disputes,
courts should make every effort to avoid needlessly disturbing other
aspects of the parties' relationship and needlessly encroaching upon
states' at-will and just-cause jurisprudence.2 5 1 Third, by making certain
strategic operational choices, employers can greatly increase their
chances of satisfying the "would have discovered" standard. These
points are discussed in turn below.
The "would have discovered" standard allows courts to address the
discrimination issue in a balanced and equitable manner that leaves the
parties essentially where courts found them regarding the wrongful
discharge issue. 252  For example, by adopting the "would have
discovered" standard, McKennon could have avoided giving the Banner
the benefit of the doubt as to whether it would have discovered Ms.
McKennon's misconduct. Had the Banner failed to satisfy the "would
have discovered" standard, the Court reasonably could have inferred
that the Banner would not have discovered the employees' misconduct
absent the discrimination suit and, consequently, excluded the after-
acquired evidence. Or if employers show that they would have
discovered the after-acquired evidence, but fail to show when they would
have done so, the Court could heed Anderson 253 by approximating the
amount of back pay that the plaintiff would have earned but for the
employer's unlawful discrimination. Of course, employers fully satisfy
the "would have discovered" standard, the Court could award a back
pay amount that reflects reality.
1992). The following passage reflects something of the complexity of labor-management
relationships:
The labor-management relationship does not exist in a vacuum and is not an entity
separate from other aspects of our economy.... [T]here are three main participants or
actors; hierarchies of workers (who may or may not be unionized), hierarchies of
management (who may or may not be owners) and the government. The actors are held
together by a common ideology or belief system of the role of each of the other actors.
These actors operate within the context of environmental influences, which consist of:
technological features of work, market or budgetary constraints, and the distribution of
power within the larger society, which includes access to political power as well as
popular opinion and support. The workplace ... is governed by a 'web of rules.' Some
* . . are substantive, such as the wage rate or number of employees to be assigned to
work on a particular machine. Other rules deal with procedures for making decisions,
such as basing layoffs on seniority .... The "web of rules" in turn has a feedback effect
on the environmental factors.
Id. (citations omitted).
25 1. See supra part III.A.3 and accompanying text.
252. Nor is the "would have discovered" standard an evidentiary black hole for employers. See,
e.g., Murnane v. American Air Lines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (approving employer's
refusals to hire that would have occurred absent any unlawful motives because the employer proved
that, in the next step of the hiring process, they would have uncovered a legitimate reason for not
hiring the plaintiffs).




1. "Would Have Discovered" Standard Preserves Reality
From at least two perspectives, employers who fail the "would have
discovered" standard are no worse off than they would have been
without discrimination suits. First, employers purchase surveillance or
investigative systems of varying levels of efficacy at corresponding
prices. By adopting relatively superficial (cheaper) investigative systems,
employers define the scope of their reasonable expectations for
discovering employee misconduct. Therefore, by ignoring after-
acquired evidence that employers would not ordinarily have discovered,
courts do not deprive employers of any right to which employers had a
reasonable expectation. 254 By adopting superficial investigative schemes,
employers implicitly accept the likelihood that they will catch fewer
wrongdoers than they otherwise would. Employers opt for the cheaper
systems after either implicit or explicit cost-benefit analysis. At some
point then, marginal savings from cheaper, less productive systems
presumably offset marginal costs that employees' undetected
misconduct impose on productive efficiency and workmanship. 255 The
"did discover" standard allows employers to retain the financial benefits
of superficial investigative systems and gratuitously affords them the
benefits of more thorough investigative schemes that they previously
rejected. Even if employers never discover the after-acquired evidence,
they are no worse off, given the quid pro quo of ignorance for lower
operating costs that they voluntarily adopted. Thus the "did discover"
standard gives employers a better deal than they ever bargained for or
deserve .256
254. In fact, by accepting after-acquired evidence, courts give employers the benefits of a more
thorough investigative system that employers had intentionally rejected for the economy of more
superficial systems. See also McGinley, supra note 83, at 205 (stating:
Given that the employer may choose not to investigate, the jury could conclude that the
company made a financial decision that the need for accuracy in the application did not
outweigh the cost of the investigation. Thus, a jury could conclude that the employer did
not meet its burden of proving that it would have fired the plaintiff had it learned of the
misrepresentation.).
255. Because no surveillance or investigatory system is perfect, employers lack the choice of
reducing employee misconduct-related costs to zero.
256. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.. 31 F.3d 1221, 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing
that courts should permit employers to rely on after-acquired evidence if the employers can "insulate
[their] illegal actions from [their] discovery of the disfavorable evidence"). To do this, employers
must demonstrate that they: (I) "would have inevitably discovered the evidence in the normal
progression of things (that is, assuming no litigation)"; or (2) happened upon the evidence "completely
independently of any investigation prompted by the discriminatory employment action or its aftermath,
including the legal proceedings." Id. Moreover, the court would require employers to establish "with
reasonable certainty the date of the inevitable or independent discovery." Id.
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In contrast, the "would have discovered" standard more closely
approximates reality and leaves the parties closer to where they would
have been but for employers' unlawful acts.257 The "would have
discovered" standard merely requires employers to show that their
surveillance or investigatory systems would have detected the misconduct
at some point in time. 258 But for employers' unlawful discrimination
against employees, matters between those parties would have proceeded
as normal under the level of surveillance and investigation systems that
employers purchased. By creating an analog of reality, the "would have
discovered" standard allows the judiciary to probe employee-employer
relationships more thoroughly, extract the price of discrimination from
employers, and withdraw, leaving the parties' relationship as close to
where it would have been as possible. Employers benefit from this
approach because they learn of previously unknown employee
misconduct and can then pursue their remedies, if any, in more
appropriate forums.
H. THE WINDFALL ARGUMENT
Some might object that because employees, in after-acquired
evidence disputes, are wrongdoers, any remedial standard that increases
the amount of their remedial relief, beyond the point where employers
find after-acquired evidence, gives employees a windfall. 259 However,
windfalls are not necessarily undesirable in all circumstances. In
Stafford Metal Works v. Cook Paint & Varnish260 for example, the court
said:
257. Inherent in the "would discover" standard is the requirement that employers show
approximately when they would discover after-acquired evidence. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co.,
968 F.2d 1174. 1184 (11 th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Dunn has introduced no evidence whatsoever
indicating when it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence if Neil had not been female and
had not asserted her rights under Title VII or the EPA") (emphasis added).
258. See Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1235 n.25 (noting that "many employers in fact responsibly
investigate applicants across-the-board before hiring someone") (emphasis added).
259. See, e.g.. Merritt B. Chastain III, The Guiding Light or Simply More Disarray?: A
Principled Analysis of the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine after McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.. 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1107 (1995) (stating that "[i]f the employee is allowed to collect
damages beyond the point of discovery [the point designated by the "did discover"
standard]-damages to which he is not entitled-then he is being granted more than would make him
whole. Compensation beyond the date of discovery would constitute a windfall for the employee-a
result Congress certainly could not have intended."); see also Barbara Ryniker Evans & Robert E.
McKnight. Jr., Splitting the Baby on After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases. 19
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 241, 243-44 (1995) ("Permitting back pay to accrue until the evidence is
discovered also encourages plaintiffs to resist discovery through abusive objections aimed at
prolonging accrual of back pay. Such an oversight makes short work of established goals of judicial
economy, contributing to further delays in an already overburdened court system.").
260. 418 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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The well-worn traditional policy of avoiding a windfall to the
wrongdoer is the most often asserted justification for allowing
subrogation. . . . Since this is a products liability case . . . the
principal basis of action is strict liability . . . . The concept of
strict liability negates any notion of moral fault or equitable
wrongdoing and robs the "windfall" argument of its
traditional validity.26 1
Stafford demonstrates that dire concerns about windfalls do not
permeate all of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and need not paralyze courts
confronted with countervailing social policy intended to remove deeply-
rooted social ills. Moreover, McKennon explicitly stated that: "In
determining appropriate remedial action, the employee's wrongdoing
becomes relevant not to punish the employee, or out of concern 'for the
relative moral worth of the parties."' 2 6 2  In after-acquired evidence
litigation, both parties are wrongdoers, therefore, denying remedies to
employees is a windfall for employers and, but for the antidiscrimination
policy, granting remedies to employees would be a windfall for them. At
such a crossroads, courts should favor parties whose interests more
closely align with the primary goals of underlying statutory policies.
Again, in Stafford, the court noted: "Indeed, one of the underlying
policies of strict liability is the need to allocate 'a more or less inevitable
loss to be charged against a complex and dangerous civilization, and
liability is imposed upon the party best able to shoulder it."'263
By its very nature strict liability litigation usually does not involve
situations where both the plaintiff and defendant are wrongdoers. Yet,
notions of risk distribution, 264 deterrence,2 6 5 and compensation of
plaintiffs26 6 drive remedial decisions about the situs of liability and the
261. Stafford Metal Works v. Cook Paint & Varnish, 418 F. Supp. 56, 61-62 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
(emphasis added).
262. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995) (quoting Pelma
Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
263. See Stafford, 418 F. Supp. at 62 (emphasis added) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 75 at 492094 (1971)).
264. See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval. Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 869
(1986) (citing Emerson G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Alaska Enter., 732 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984)) (finding
"that the safety and insurance rationales behind strict liability apply equally where the losses are
purely economic").
265. See. e.g., Carley v. Wheeled Coach. 991 F.2d 1117, 1135 (3rd Cir. 1993) (stating that "[tihe
[government contractors'] defense also conflicts with the deterrence rationale behind strict liability:
immunizing government contractors will give them little incentive to scrutinize government-provided
or government-approved design specifications for potential dangers") (Becker, J.. concurring and
dissenting).
266. Id. (noting that the government contractor defense places "the full cost of accidents
resulting from design defects on injured parties, thereby thwarting both the policy of compensating
injured persons and the policy of risk-spreading") (Becker, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis
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quantum of recovery in strict liability litigation. 267 In after-acquired
evidence disputes, the issue is equally policy-laddened -upon which
party should remedial liability lie to best promote the antidiscriminatory
policy? Concerns about windfalls should scarcely dominate the analysis
of that issue.
Two other reasons suggest that one should not be overly concerned
about denying windfalls to ADEA plaintiffs in after-acquired evidence
litigation. First, McKennon stated that: "Equity's maxim . . . of unclean
hands . . . has not been applied where Congress authorizes broad
equitable relief to serve important national policies. We have rejected
the unclean hands defense 'where a private suit serves important public
purposes."' 268 That plaintiffs are wrongdoers is a major reason for the
difficulty in resolving remedial issues in after-acquired evidence
disputes. 269 Under these circumstances, the proper route is to rely on
policy 270 because both parties are wrongdoers; therefore, moral 2 7 1 and
equitable 272 considerations cancel out of the analysis.Second, those who argue that ADEA plaintiffs would receive
windfalls if they receive full remedial benefits basically substitute a
presumption for proof that a windfall exists.273 Plaintiffs do not receive
a windfall if in fact their misconduct would not have been discovered in
the normal course of events. The greater danger is not that plaintiffs will
receive a windfall under the "would have discovered" standard, but that
they will suffer unrealistic and inequitable deprivations under the "did
discover" standard.274
added).
267. See Stafford, 418 F. Supp. at 61. See generally I DOBBS, supra note 224, § 98, at 692-94
(discussing cost spreading, compensating victims, and deterring sale of unsafe products in relation to
strict liability).
268. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.. 115 S. Ct. 879, 885 (quoting Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968) (emphasis added).
269. McKennon 11I, 115 S. Ct. at 886 (observing that placing plaintiffs in the status quo ante in
after-acquired evidence litigation "is difficult to apply with precision where there is after-acquired
evidence of [plaintiffs'] wrongdoing that would have led to termination on legitimate grounds had the
employer known about it").
270. Throughout its opinion, McKennon heavily relied on policy to reach its decision. Unfor-
tunately, the Court failed to assign enough weight to employees' and society's interests relative to
employers.
271. McKennon III, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
272. Id. See also supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (rejecting the applicability of the
clean hands doctrine in after-acquired evidence).
273. 1 DOBBS, supra note 224. at 374-76 (discussing whether market shares should be
minimized).




McKennon harbors both bad and good news. The bad news is
multifaceted: (1) at the outset, the Court elected to consider wrongful
discharge issues (purely state material) as an affirmative defense in
federal discrimination litigation; (2) then the Court adopted the "did
discover" standard which gives employers the wrong incentives and
places a premium on ransacking the files of minorities and other
protected employees, searching for evidence of prior misconduct; and
(3) the Court permitted employers to use after-acquired evidence to
decimate employees' remedies under the ADEA, thereby substantially
diluting the integrity and efficacy of the antidiscriminatory policy.
McKennon's approach, therefore, gives employers a wide berth to
eviscerate the civil rights of their employees. The good news is that the
Court actually acknowledged the intended effect of the
antidiscriminatory policy. In addition, the Court poured some content
into that policy by refusing to bar imperfect employees from all relief
under the ADEA.
Finally, a factor that may be either good or bad is that McKennon
left much to be decided. In this respect, one can only hope that the
Court does not erect substantive and evidentiary standards that thwart
employees' efforts to implement any remaining rights they have under
McKennon. Ultimately, one is left with a reed of hope in a sea of hostile
precedent that is a judicial vortex for civil rights in employment.
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